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FORCED PLAY: WAS THE MLB COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
TO FORCE A 2020 MLB SEASON AMID
CORONAVIRUS UNENFORCEABLE, OR
JUST A BAD IDEA?
I. ERROR: STARTING OFF THE BASEBALL SEASON ON THE
WRONG FOOT
The novel coronavirus has had an astounding impact on every
aspect of life, from remote work and online learning to restaurant
and store closures.1  The sports industry has experienced an equally
disruptive impact in school athletic programs, recreational leagues,
and professional leagues.2  Due to the coronavirus, not only is it
unsafe for fans to gather in large crowds for events and entertain-
ment, but sports stadiums were closed to all spectators at the start of
the baseball season, and professional sports leagues have had to de-
termine the safest way to play games in which compliance with so-
cial distancing is difficult.3  There are obvious health and safety
concerns for the players and fans, but those concerns are coupled
with worry over the economic impact the coronavirus is having on
leagues such as Major League Baseball (“MLB”).4  The economic
1. See Most Americans Say the Coronavirus Has Impacted Their Lives, PEW RES. CTR.
(Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2020/03/30/most-americans-
say-coronavirus-outbreak-has-impacted-their-lives/ [https://perma.cc/RZU8-
GER5] (reporting forty-four percent of Americans believe coronavirus had major
impact on their life and nine out of ten Americans agree their life has changed in
small ways).
2. See Victor Mather, How the Coronavirus has Disrupted Sports Events, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/02/sports/coronavirus-
sports.html [https://perma.cc/PF36-26BK] (detailing coronavirus’s impact on va-
rious leagues, in particular on total revenue collected).
3. See Sebastian Pellejero & Heather Gillers, As Covid-19 Closes Stadiums, Mu-
nicipalities Struggle with Billions in Debt, WALL ST. J. (June 4, 2020), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/as-covid-19-closes-stadiums-municipalities-struggle-with-bil-
lions-in-debt-11591263000 [https://perma.cc/8U5R-BXTU] (stating cities and
municipalities are struggling to pay off debt acquired to build stadiums in light of
reduced revenue from coronavirus restrictions).
4. See Jeff Passan & Kiley McDaniel, What the MLB Deal with Players Means for
2020 Season and Beyond, ESPN (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/
_/id/28964249/what-mlb-deal-players-means-2020-season-beyond [https://
perma.cc/7L5L-NZG8] (recognizing shorter baseball seasons mean less money for
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concerns for the MLB are particularly acute as players’ salaries are
tied to any growths or losses in the MLB’s revenue.5
The MLB season, including revenue sharing and players’ sala-
ries, is governed by a collective bargaining agreement signed by the
Major League Baseball Players Association (“MLBPA”) and the
owners of the thirty major league teams, represented by the MLB
Commissioner.6  The agreement between the MLBPA and the own-
ers provides for a wide array of terms, including the Uniform
Player’s Contract, negotiation and approval of contracts, schedul-
ing, players’ salary schedules, safety and health provisions, and
spring training.7  The interruption of the traditional baseball sea-
son caused by the coronavirus prevented the MLB from executing a
full 2020 season because many provisions of the active collective
bargaining agreement (“2017-2021 CBA”) were simply unworkable
in light of the impact coronavirus has had on every aspect of life.8
This left the owners and the players to sort out a new arrangement
for the 2020 season.9
The MLBPA and the MLB formed an initial agreement in
March 2020 (“2020 Agreement”), and maintained ongoing negotia-
tions between the MLBPA’s and MLB’s legal teams to determine
5. See id. (discussing financial impact of coronavirus on MLB).  The MLB has
experienced several years of growth, with revenues increasing consistently from
$3.58 billion in revenue in 2001 to $10.7 billion in revenue in 2019. See Christina
Gough, Major League Baseball Total League Revenue from 2001 to 2018 (in billion U.S.
Dollars), STATISTA (May 20, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/193466/to-
tal-league-revenue-of-the-mlb-since-2005/ [https://perma.cc/2QKY-LL32 ] (citing
Forbes) (tracking MLB total league revenue from 2001 to 2019).  However, even
following a record setting year last year, the impact of coronavirus on the MLB’s
financial health will likely be large.  See Passan and McDaniel, supra note 4 (discuss-
ing economic impact on MLB from coronavirus).
6. See Daniel A. Rascher & T.D. DeSchriver, Smooth Operators: Recent Collective
Bargaining in Major League Baseball, 7 INT’L J. OF SPORT FIN. 176, 204 (2004) (ac-
knowledging MLB as first league to establish collective bargaining).  The MLBPA
was formed in 1954 and has represented players since then. See id. (discussing
MLBPA formation and relation to collective bargaining).
7. See generally 2017-2021 MLB-MLBPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
[hereinafter “2017-2021 CBA”], available at https://d39ba378-ae47-4003-86d3-
147e4fa6e51b.filesusr.com/ugd/
b0a4c2_95883690627349e0a5203f61b93715b5.pdf [https://perma.cc/S88R-
GLMC ] (last visited Aug. 30, 2020) (providing basic agreement between MLB and
MLBPA for duration of five years).
8. See Dayn Perry et. al., Timeline of How the Coronavirus Has Impacted the 2020
MLB Season, CBS SPORTS (Jul. 29, 2020), https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/
timeline-of-how-the-covid-19-pandemic-has-impacted-the-2020-major-league-base-
ball-season/ [https://perma.cc/WMG8-EL9J ] (demonstrating alterations to sea-
son schedule as set forth in agreement as early as March 12, 2020 when spring
training was cancelled).
9. See id. (describing changes made to timing of MLB season as a result of
coronavirus).
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what an abbreviated, somewhat socially distant 2020 season could
look like for several weeks.10  The initial agreement in March stated
that the MLB Commissioner could mandate a season, in which case
players would get 100% of their prorated salaries, and stated that
best efforts would be made to play as many games as possible.11
The MLBPA and the MLB did not, however, agree on the length of
an abbreviated season, leaving the MLB Commissioner to enforce
his right to mandate a season and resulting in a sixty-game schedule
beginning July 23, 2020.12  Almost immediately after the 2020 MLB
season officially began, the MLB faced several obstacles as players
continued to test positive for coronavirus despite the health and
safety protocols in effect.13  Continued positive coronavirus tests
from players, combined with the decision of some well-known play-
ers to opt-out of the season, raised confusion as to the motivation of
players to continue playing as well as concerns regarding the level
of protection afforded to players.14   The idea of an imposed season
during a global pandemic, even with new health and safety proto-
cols in effect, leaves an impression of unfairness for players who are
10. See id. (detailing continued changes to agreement between MLBPA and
MLB from March to May and beyond).
11. See Michael Silverman, MLB, Players Agree on Format for 2020 Season, with
Games Starting in Late July ,  BOS. GLOBE (June 23, 2020), https://
www.bostonglobe.com/2020/06/23/sports/mlb-season-now-only-being-held-up-
by-health-safety-protocols/ [https://perma.cc/5JNM-KV4Z] (noting neither own-
ers nor players really got what they wanted in negotiations).  Owners wanted play-
ers to bear a portion of lost revenues, claiming the lost revenues from empty
stadiums would be too much for owners to bear. See id. (describing dismay over
negotiations).  Players’ distrust towards owners meant that they did not believe the
owners’ predicted losses were accurate, and this distrust was visible throughout
negotiations about compensation for the 2020 season. See id. (identifying reasons
for problems during negotiations and impact on ultimate result).
12. See Silverman, supra note 11 (reporting stalled negotiations around num-
ber of games to be played in 2020, with players refusing to accept offers of fewer
than seventy games).  Players eventually decided not to counter the MLB owners’
sixty-game offer, at which point the Commissioner was forced to exercise his ability
to force a season. See id. (explaining how final result of negotiations came about).
13. See Matt Loede, MLB Delivers 67-page Document to MLBPA Outlining Safety
Protocols for Baseball’s Return, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 16, 2020), https://
www.si.com/mlb/indians/news/mlb-delivers-67-page-document-to-mlbpa-outlin-
ing-safety-protocols-for-baseballs-return [https://perma.cc/2KX3-5LK3 ] (high-
lighting new safety protocols including coronavirus tests “on a regular basis” and
restrictions in MLB teams’ facilities).
14. See Passan & McDaniel, supra note 4 (describing players’ incentives to play
for compensation and service time).  Players are generally only allowed to enter
arbitration without consent of the team to dispute salaries after three years of play.
See 2017-2021 CBA, supra note 7, at art. 6, § E(1)(a) (discussing eligibility of players
to arbitrate final salaries).
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concerned about their health and safety.15  This rings especially
true when many activities such as going into the office for work and
attending school in classrooms are still on hold in much of the
country.16
This Comment discusses the various contract doctrines under
which the MLBPA’s performance could have been excused, ulti-
mately assessing why these legal arguments reflect that the decision
to play a 2020 MLB season was a bad idea (as implemented) regard-
less of whether the agreement was enforceable.17  Part II discusses
the history of MLB negotiations (including negotiations for the
2020 Agreement), assessing why the 2020 season interruption is
unique.18  Part III defines the legal doctrines the MLBPA could
have relied on to defend a refusal to perform under the 2020
Agreement.19  Part IV of this Comment analyzes the potential argu-
ments the MLBPA would make under each of the defined doctrines
and assesses why the arguments the MLBPA could make under
each doctrine are also arguments likely to cause a stoppage during
2021 collective bargaining agreement negotiations.20  Part V of this
Comment analyzes the lessons the MLB and MLBPA can learn from
their surprisingly successful 2020 season.21  Finally, Part VI predicts
15. See Amanda Diekman (@Amanda_Diekman), TWITTER (Apr. 17, 2020,
3:35 PM), https://twitter.com/Amanda_Diekman/status/1251232891373268996
[https://perma.cc/L68V-6KBJ] (stating unfairness of expecting players to risk
health for entertainment of fans).
16. See Passan & McDaniel, supra note 4 (questioning likelihood of keeping
players healthy throughout MLB season).
17. For further discussion of the agreement under a defense that the agree-
ment is void as against public policy, see infra notes 177-211 and accompanying
text.  For further discussion of the agreement under a defense that it is uncon-
scionable, see infra notes 212-250 and accompanying text.  For further discussion
of the agreement under a defense of undue influence, see infra notes 254-261 and
accompanying text.
18. For further discussion of historic and current MLB negotiations, see infra
notes 43-74 and accompanying text.
19. For further discussion of contract doctrines that reflect the MLBPA’s
grievances with the MLB, see infra notes 109-165 and accompanying text.  For fur-
ther discussion of which doctrines could have applied to the MLBPA’s agreement
with the MLB, see infra notes 252-253 and accompanying text.
20. For further discussion of the MLBPA’s violation of public policy argu-
ment, see infra notes 177-211 and accompanying text.  For further discussion of
the unconscionability argument the MLBPA could make, see infra notes 212-250
and accompanying text.  For further discussion of the undue influence argument
the MLBPA could make, see infra notes 254-261 and accompanying text.
21. For further discussion of the 2020 season, see infra notes 97-108 and ac-
companying text.
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how the forced season and the ugly negotiations surrounding it
could negatively impact the MLB moving forward.22
II. COVER YOUR BASES: MLB NEGOTIATIONS PAST AND PRESENT
This Section provides necessary background to understand the
relationship between the MLB and the MLBPA and their 2020 ne-
gotiations – Part A of this Section discusses the legal structure
under which the MLBPA and the MLB negotiate and structure
their relationship.23  Part B of this Section details past interruptions
to MLB seasons, differentiating the 2020 season interruption.24
Part C of this Section tracks the impact of coronavirus on the MLB,
from early interruption of spring training to the final 2020
Agreement.25
A. Major League Baseball and Collective Bargaining
The MLBPA has a long history of negotiating with team owners
on behalf of the MLB’s players.26  Collective bargaining agreements
between the MLBPA and the MLB owners are governed by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, which establishes procedures for labor
organizations as representatives of employees.27  In particular, the
National Labor Relations Act sets forth the requirement that em-
ployers and employees “meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and condi-
tions of employment.”28  The MLBPA functions as a representative
for all major league players, negotiating for the players as a group
22. For further discussion of the impact of the 2020 season on the MLB, see
infra notes 313-322 and accompanying text.
23. For further discussion of the MLBPA’s relationship with the MLB, see in-
fra notes 26-42 and accompanying text.
24. For further discussion of historical interruptions to MLB seasons, see infra
notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
25. For further discussion of the impact coronavirus has had on MLB’s 2020
season, see infra notes 55-108 and accompanying text.
26. See Rascher & DeSchriver, supra note 6, at 179 (detailing MLBPA’s forma-
tion in 1954 and subsequent growth throughout 1970s beyond bargaining leverage
of traditional unions).
27. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018) (establishing right of employees to self
organize).
28. See Ryan Probasco, Revisiting the Service Time Quandary: Does Service Time
Manipulation of Minor League Baseball Players Violate MLB’s Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment?, 15 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. 1, 11 (2019) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2018))
(detailing that obligation set forth in National Labor Relations Act to confer in
good faith does not require any party to agree on negotiated terms).
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to form the collective bargaining agreements with the MLB.29  This
makes the MLBPA-MLB relationship co-dependent because the
MLB provides the only national and global platform for players in
the MLBPA to play professionally, and the MLBPA provides the
only source for players with unique skillsets that are difficult to
replace.30
In the last half century, the collective bargaining agreements
between the MLB and the MLBPA have ranged from three to five-
year agreements.31  During each collective bargaining agreement
negotiation, different issues have created challenges in the negotia-
tions.32  In 1973, it was the adoption of salary arbitration, in 1985
(and again in 1993) it was revenue sharing, and in 2006 it was ster-
oid use and drug tests.33  A large cause of the difficult negotiations
between the MLBPA and the MLB has been the players’ distrust
towards team owners, which was visible in the most recent negotia-
tions for the 2020 MLB season.34
29. See Rascher & DeSchriver, supra note 6, at 203 (describing MLBPA as a
“close shop” union since it requires all players to be members of and represented
by MLBPA).
30. See id. at 204-205 (noting there is no alternative league competing for pro-
fessional baseball talent in United States or globally, with exception of rare few
players who ever play overseas in foreign leagues).  Rascher and DeSchriver also
note that all players who want to participate in the MLB must join the MLBPA. See
id. at 204 (explaining MLBPA and MLB relationship and MLBPA’s representation
of players since 1954).
31. See id. at 181-83 (comparing features of collective bargaining agreements
from 1973 to 2011).  The negotiations took varying lengths of time depending on
factors such as the volatile relationship between the players and the owners, the
negotiating styles of the MLB Commissioner and the MLBPA’s president, the is-
sues of contention between the negotiating parties, and the players’ trust (or lack
thereof) in the owners. See generally id. (discussing causes of varying success of
negotiations for MLB collective bargaining agreements).
32. See infra notes 33-34 (discussing points of disagreement between MLB and
MLBPA).
33. See generally Rascher & DeSchriver, supra note 6 (tracking collective bar-
gaining history in Major League Baseball).  While the MLB has ultimately had
fewer stoppages and strikes due to disagreements around collective bargaining
than other American major sports leagues, there are still moments in which the
MLB has experienced interruptions due to these disagreements. See id. at 205-06
(comparing MLB’s collective bargaining issues with other leagues’ bargaining is-
sues).  For further discussion of the interruptions Major League Baseball has ex-
perienced as a result of failed collective bargaining negotiations, see infra notes 43-
54 and accompanying text.
34. See Ryan Probasco, supra note 28, at 3-4 (“The driving force of the intensi-
fying strain between baseball players and club owners is rooted in the economic
landscape of the league.”); see also Rascher & DeSchriver, supra note 6, at 185 (cit-
ing Andrew Zimbalist, May the Best Team Win: Baseball Economics and Public Policy,
BROOKINGS INST. (2003)) (recognizing players’ distrust towards owners has nega-
tively impacted collective bargaining negotiations).
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The 2017-2021 CBA is a five-year agreement, spanning the
2017 season through the 2021 season.35  The 2017-2021 CBA man-
dates each of the thirty teams within the league be scheduled for
162 games in each season, spanning across a total of 183 days with
up to twenty interleague games per season.36  The agreement also
sets a minimum salary for each season based on service time, and a
calculation for daily rate of pay based on the standard length of a
season.37  It also creates a Safety and Health Advisory Committee
and sets forth the guidelines for handling player injury – though
with no mention of a pandemic or epidemic.38  These provisions,
suitable for a traditional season, quickly became unworkable as the
MLB postponed spring training, then pushed the season’s start
date, creating necessity for the MLB and the MLBPA to make sev-
eral alterations to accommodate coronavirus health and safety pre-
cautions throughout the last year.39
Additionally, topics at issue in past collective bargaining negoti-
ations were again contentious in both the negotiations for the 2017-
2021 CBA and negotiations for the 2020 season.40  In particular, the
luxury tax, salary arbitration, free agency, and higher minimum
compensation were areas of contention, as players have increasingly
felt they are undercompensated and undervalued by the team own-
ers.41  These topics were all at issue prior to the worldwide spread of
35. See generally 2017-2021 CBA, art. I (setting forth terms of employment for
all MLB players for baseball seasons in 2017 through 2021).
36. See id. at art. V § A (discussing length of season, process for qualification
in postseason play following completion of regular season, and impact of interna-
tional “openers” on schedule); id. § D (proffering rotational format of interleague
play in season).
37. See id. at art. VI, §§ A, C (setting minimum salary requirements based on
service time, adjusted each year for inflation, and providing formula for calculat-
ing daily pay based on season length).
38. See id. at art. XIII (creating Safety and Health Advisory Committee tasked
with “deal[ing] with emergency safety and health problems as they arise” and “en-
gag[ing] in review of, planning for and maintenance of safe and healthful working
conditions for Players”).
39. See Perry et al., supra note 8 (highlighting uncertainty surrounding MLB’s
2020 season due to coronavirus).
40. See Gabe Lacques, MLB Players Are Ready to ‘Burn the Whole System Down.’
Here’s What They Want to Avoid a Strike, USA TODAY (Feb. 22, 2019), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/columnist/gabe-lacques/2019/02/22/mlb-
collective-bargaining-agreement-strike/2948101002/ [https://perma.cc/3YKV-
U5VD ] (reviewing players’ grievances with team owners and terms unfavorable to
players in 2017-2021 CBA); Rascher & DeSchriver, supra note 6 (noting areas of
contention in recent collective bargaining negotiations); see generally Perry et al.,
supra note 8 (tracking proposals and counterproposals between MLB and MLBPA
during 2020 negotiations).
41. See Lacques, supra note 40 (analyzing terms of 2017-2021 CBA to show why
players are upset with active agreement).
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the coronavirus, and they were put at the forefront of players’
minds again as the MLB and the MLBPA negotiated compensation
for a season unworkable under the terms of the 2017-2021 CBA.42
B. Past Interruptions to MLB Seasons
The coronavirus pandemic not only created the need for a new
agreement between the MLB and the MLBPA during an active col-
lective bargaining agreement, but the coronavirus uniquely inter-
rupted MLB game play.43  There have been several interruptions to
traditional MLB seasons historically, each of which had varying im-
pacts on the season at the time.44  The interruption most similar to
the current season occurred in 1918, when a combination of World
War I and the Spanish Influenza caused the 1918 season to be cut
one month short and the start of the 1919 season to be delayed.45
The 1918-1919 seasons were the only stoppages in MLB’s history in
which a government order impeded on gameplay – during World
War II President Roosevelt famously wanted baseball played.46
42. See Silverman, supra note 11 (acknowledging initially optimistic negotia-
tions derailed as players’ and owners’ positions failed to align).
43. See Craig Calcaterra, Looking Back at Baseball’s Previously Shortened Seasons,
NBC SPORTS (Mar. 13, 2020), https://mlb.nbcsports.com/2020/03/13/looking-
back-at-baseballs-previously-shortened-seasons/ [https://perma.cc/8997-BVPF ]
(describing current situation for sports leagues due to pandemic as “uncharted
territory”).
44. See id. (analyzing whether past MLB interruptions provide guidance for
2020 season).
45. See Grant Suneson, World War I is Among the Times Entire Sports Leagues Were
Cancelled Before Covid-19, USA TODAY, (Apr. 12, 2020) https://www.usatoday.com/
story/money/2020/04/12/16-times-entire-sports-leagues-were-cancelled-before-
coronavirus/111525066/ [https://perma.cc/3N24-8LT2 ] (describing shortened
1918 season and early World Series as effort to free up players for war effort); see
also Calcaterra, supra note 43 (ascribing early end of 1918 season to WWI). But see
Thomas Boswell, Baseball Has Survived Pandemics Before, and for Desperate Fans, That
Counts, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/
2020/03/18/baseball-has-survived-pandemics-before-desperate-fans-that-counts/
[https://perma.cc/LC8P-V2ZX] (attributing 1918 season interruption to Spanish
Influenza pandemic of 1918).  The U.S. Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, issued
an order that draft-eligible men whose jobs were considered “non-essential” were
to sign up for war related work, at which point the regular season was cut short and
the World Series moved to September. See Matt Kelly, ‘On Account of War’, NAT’L
BASEBALL HALL OF FAME, https://baseballhall.org/discover-more/stories/short-
stops/1918-world-war-i-baseball [https://perma.cc/9AD4-4N87] (last visited Sept.
1, 2020) (describing accelerated end of 1918 regular season with seven
doubleheaders in one day to make time for September 5 to September 11 World
Series).  The Secretary of War required “draft-eligible men employed in ‘non-es-
sential’ occupations” to apply for work that supported the war, or risk being
drafted. See Calcaterra, supra note 43 (noting by July, teams were missing an aver-
age of fifteen players between drafted and enlisted players).
46. See Suneson, supra note 45 (noting sports were encouraged to continue
during WWII, despite roster shortages due to war efforts, as President Roosevelt
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Aside from the shortened MLB seasons during World War I,
the only other cause of an abbreviated or cancelled season in the
history of the MLB has been due to labor strikes and lockouts.47
These labor dispute stoppages have revolved around similar issues
to the ones that stalled negotiations during the most recent collec-
tive bargaining negotiations, namely salary arbitration, free agency,
player compensation, and revenue-sharing.48  The longest of these
labor dispute stoppages was caused by a labor strike during the
1994-95 collective bargaining agreement negotiations, which ended
the MLB regular season about fifty games early, cancelled the post-
season, and concluded only after a U.S. District Court forced the
MLB and the MLBPA to reach an agreement.49  In fact, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) found that the MLB owners
negotiated and acted unfairly towards the players during the 1994-
95 negotiations.50  The unfair tactics used by the MLB owners dur-
ing 1994-95 negotiations harbored a distrust between the MLBPA
sought to keep up public morale). See generally Calcaterra, supra note 43 (reviewing
all mass interruptions in baseball).  The All-American Girls Baseball League was
also created in 1943 to fill the void the draft had left in MLB baseball during the
war. See League History, ALL-AMERICAN GIRLS PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL LEAGUE,
https://www.aagpbl.org/history/league-history [https://perma.cc/4T8D-XJ65]
(last visited Mar. 1, 2021) (explaining womens’ league as Chicago Cubs owner
Philip Wrigley’s solution to expected loss of MLB players to draft).
47. See Calcaterra, supra note 43 (detailing mass cancellations (excluding one-
game cancellations) impacting MLB were either WWI, WWII or labor related); see
also Rascher & DeSchriver, supra note 6, at 177 (citing Andrew Zimbalist, May the
Best Team Win: Baseball Economics and Public Policy, BROOKINGS INSTIT. (2003)) (not-
ing MLB’s history of work stoppage from strikes or lockouts from 1972 to 1995).
48. See Rascher & DeSchriver, supra note 6, at 185-87 (discussing each collec-
tive bargaining agreement negotiation in detail alongside strikes or lockouts occur-
ring during negotiations, where applicable and describing 1994-1995 strike as most
contentious collective bargaining negotiation in MLB’s history).  The lockout
lasted 232 days and cost the league 938 regular season games across all thirty
teams. See id. at 177 (describing impact of lockout on league).  The bargaining
agreement was opened in 1993 by owners, with little communication between own-
ers and managers for the first six months of the year. See id. at 185 (detailing
owners voted to open current agreement early by vote of fifteen to thirteen).  The
owners had the ability to declare an impasse and impose the new collective bar-
gaining agreement for the 1994 season as they wrote it if the players did not agree
to it by the end of 1993. See id. at 186 (describing owners’ negotitations on reve-
nue sharing as a dealying tactic so they could impose owners’ last offer).  The
players scheduled the strike for August 12, 1994 when there was still no agreement
between owners and players. See id. (noting owners then refused to pay into play-
ers’ pension funds).
49. See Suneson, supra note 45 (discussing terms at issue in negotiations and
concessions owners asked players to make as obstacle to new agreement).
50. See Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 880
F. Supp. 246, 255-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding NLRB had reasonable cause to be-
lieve owners engaged in unfair labor practices and that injunction against owners
was proper). Silverman, written by now-Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor, found
that the owners had failed to negotiate in good faith with the players in violation of
9
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and MLB owners that was still visible during both 2017-2021 CBA
negotiations and the 2020 Agreement negotiations.51
Whenever MLB games have been cancelled due to game play
stoppages – whether because of war, lockouts, or labor strikes – the
MLB has seen a corresponding decrease in revenue.52  Money is a
driving factor in the collective bargaining agreement negotiations,
and following the 1994-95 strike and shortened 1995 season, mas-
sive efforts were made on the part of both the MLB and the MLBPA
to avoid stoppages due to failed negotiations because of the nega-
tive impact on revenue.53  Unfortunately, as the 2020 season has
been played without revenue-generating activity, the stalled negoti-
ations between the MLBPA and MLB owners has been unsurpris-
ing, foreshadowing continuing animosity between the two groups.54
National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(1), 8(a)(5). See id. at 261 (explaining lack of
good faith in negotiations and unlawful activity by owners).
51. See Suneson, supra note 45 (describing owners’ tactics in 1994, including
changing terms to benefit owners and asking for concessions from players on “sal-
ary caps, arbitration, revenue splitting, pensions, licensing revenue, free agency,
and more”); see also Rascher and Deschriver, supra note 6, at 186 (explaining own-
ers’ tactics to unilaterally impose their last offer as new collective bargaining agree-
ment when new agreement favored owners considerably).  Once players set a strike
date of August 12, owners refused to pay into the players’ pension fund, so players
sued for unfair labor practices. See Rascher & Deschriver, supra note 6, at 186
(describing long term results of strike).
52. See Victor A. Matheson, The Effects of Labour Strikes on Consumer Demand in
Professional Sports: Revisited, 38 APPLIED ECON. 1173, 1179 (2006) (reporting short-
term revenue loss after labor strikes and additional long-term revenue loss as result
of strikes, though losses were offset by new stadiums drawing in fans and increasing
attendance).
53. See Rascher & DeSchriver, supra note 6, at 201 (noting both MLB and
MLBPA recognized lost revenue as product of 1994 labor strike and commenting
that both sides worked to avoid similar strike in 2011); see also Lacques, supra note
40 (reporting major tensions between players and owners under 2017-2021 CBA,
marking end of peaceful labor relation driven by high revenue for both players
and owners); Anthony Witrado, If it Weren’t for the Money, the 2020 MLB Season
Would be Cancelled, FORBES (Aug. 4, 2020) https://www.forbes.com/sites/
anthonywitrado/2020/08/04/if-it-werent-for-the-money-the-2020-mlb-season-
would-be-cancelled/#353835055ba7 [https://perma.cc/5EC6-YESR ] (arguing
MLB’s concerns over health and safety are only stated for publicity’s sake, and
MLB is driven solely by money to keep season going).
54. See Silverman, supra note 11 (describing both MLB and MLBPA as “en-
trenched” in their positions, leading to stalemate for 2020 season and likely lead-
ing to difficult negotiations in 2021 when 2017-2021 CBA expires).  The loss of
revenue-generating activity owners relied on to support argument for lower sala-
ries include fans in the stands, concession sales in ballparks, and special broadcast-
ing deals. See Elizabeth Swinton, MLBPA Rejects MLB’s Proposal, Does Not Plan to
Counter, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jun. 13, 2020), https://www.si.com/mlb/2020/06/
14/mlbpa-rejects-mlb-proposal-does-not-plan-counter [https://perma.cc/UY3F-
34LJ ] (citing lack of gate fees as huge revenue loss for MLB).
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C. MLB and Coronavirus
1. Coronavirus’s Early Impact on the MLB
The interruption to the 2020 MLB season was not the result of
a strike, but rather the ongoing health pandemic in which the 2017-
2021 CBA cannot safely be followed.55  The coronavirus’s impact
was visible in March 2020, when universities began to close, employ-
ers sent their employees home, and state governments issued stay-
at-home orders and bans on large gatherings.56  Then, the National
Basketball Association (“NBA”) announced its decision to indefi-
nitely suspend its season.57  Despite these early warning signs, the
MLB began spring training optimistic that they would find a way to
play a full season.58  However, the MLB had to reconsider when the
World Health Organization classified the coronavirus as a pan-
demic rather than an epidemic on March 11, 2020.59  Also on
March 11, Washington’s governor placed a ban on all group gather-
ings, originally through March of 2020, which left the Seattle Ma-
riners unable to play in Seattle’s T-Mobile Park.60  These obstacles
all combined to cause the MLB to reverse course and cancel spring
training in addition to postponing the regular season by two
weeks.61  Unfortunately, as stay-at-home orders remained in effect
well beyond the MLB’s optimistic two-week postponement of their
season start date, the MLB and the MLBPA had to work to create an
55. See Perry et al., supra note 8 (monitoring and recording updates to 2020
MLB season, including early positive coronavirus tests among players and minor
alterations to baseball season when owners and players thought regular season
could happen).
56. See eg. Yuki Noguchi, Coronavirus Triple Duty: Working, Parenting, and Teach-
ing from Home, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/
17/816631571/coronavirus-triple-duty-working-parenting-and-teaching-from-
home [https://perma.cc/73CX-B3XG ] (discussing massive shift from office and
work life to working and teaching kids from home in wake of Washington’s stay-at-
home orders).
57. See Perry et. al., supra note 8 (recognizing once NBA announced suspen-
sion of its season, it was only matter of time before other leagues followed suit,
which is exactly what occurred when several leagues including MLB postponed or
suspended play following NBA’s announcement).
58. See id. (“March 9, 2020: Following a conference call with all [thirty] teams,
MLB announces its intent to continue playing spring training games and to open
the regular season on March 26 as planned. The statement notes that MLB has
been in regular contact with health officials.”).
59. See id. (noting World Health Organization’s classification of coronavirus
as pandemic fell on same day as NBA’s suspension of its season).
60. See id. (detailing calendar of major decisions made by MLB and events
occurring within league such as player opt-outs from March through August).
61. See id. (recognizing MLB’s postponement of spring training correlated to
NBA’s suspension of game play).
11
Young: Forced Play: Was the MLB Commisioner's Decision to Force a 2020 M
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021
510 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28: p. 499
agreement on uncertain foundation.62  Further complications arose
in the MLB’s attempt to start the 2020 season as state government
orders dictated various precautions required for combating the
coronavirus.63
Initially, state governments imposed precautions such as stay-
at-home orders.64  However, these policies were replaced as
coronavirus numbers came down and the public began to lose pa-
tience with quarantining.65  Now, state mandates are present in the
form of limited building capacities and social distancing and mask
mandates, though the presence and strictness of mandates varies
across states.66  Additionally, while states do not generally require
that people take coronavirus tests, some states have eased other re-
quirements so that quarantine after travel is not necessary so long
as the traveler receives a negative coronavirus test upon return.67
62. See Witrado, supra note 53 (discussing continued positive test results as
MLB’s 2020 season got underway, arguing that MLB is prioritizing money and miti-
gating revenue loss over player health).
63. For further discussion of the precautions required for players, see infra
notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
64. See Deciding to Go Out, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL: COVID-19 (2019)
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/daily-life-coping/deciding-to-go-
out.html [https://perma.cc/5AD5-463F ] (presenting basic precautions against
spread of coronavirus include maintaining six feet of space between yourself and
others, holding activities outside, wearing masks, avoiding crowded spaces and
washing hands frequently).  Quarantine orders were in place statewide in forty-two
states in the U.S. and locally in parts of an additional three states during the initial
attempts to control the virus. See Sarah Mervosh, Denise Lu, & Vanessa Swales, See
Which States and Cities Have Told Residents to Stay at Home, N.Y. TIMES (updated Apr.
20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-stay-at-
home-order.html [https://perma.cc/BW8B-B82Y ] (reporting ninety-five percent
of Americans were under government instructions to prevent spread of
coronavirus by staying home).
65. See Miriam Berger et. al., Surge in Anxiety and Depression Shows Coronavirus
Toll on Mental Health in America, WASH. POST (May 26, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/05/26/coronavirus-update-us/ [https://
perma.cc/RE2C-EZRE ] (reporting American mental health reflects toll of
coronavirus, as one third of Americans show signs of clinical anxiety or
depression).
66. See Jasmine C. Lee et al., See How All 50 States are Reopening (and Closing
Again), N.Y. TIMES (Updated Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2020/us/states-reopen-map-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/SD98-8JW3
] (addressing variation in states’ reopening procedures and analyzing rush to reo-
pen due to struggling economy as cause of backtrack in procedures); see also Andy
Markowitz, State-by-State Guide to Face Mask Requirements, AARP (last updated Sept.
14, 2020), https://www.aarp.org/health/healthy-living/info-2020/states-mask-
mandates-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/2HLJ-VC7N ] (providing link to
each state’s coronavirus page for state-by-state recommendations for coronavirus
precautions).
67. See Megan Marples, Covid-19 Travel Restrictions State by State, CNN (last
updated Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/us-state-travel-re-
strictions-covid-19/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q4TA-4JVT ] (reporting Alaska
12
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These government mandates have been enacted by the executive
branches of state governments under authority granted by those
states’ legislatures.68  Additionally, the Centers for Disease Control
(“CDC”) issued guidance to wear masks, social distance, and pre-
vent close contact, representing the federal government’s precau-
tionary recommendations.69  In addition to the mandates, there has
been wildly divergent public opinion regarding masks, which im-
pacts how Americans view the risks associated with major league
sports generally.70
As the state restrictions altered over the course of the pan-
demic, the MLB continued to push the start of the 2020 season
requires negative coronavirus tests to cross into its border, and that some states
with mandates requiring travelers to quarantine upon arrival allow those travelers
to skip quarantine by providing proof of negative test).
68. See, e.g., City & Cty. of Honolulu Exec. Order No. 2020-25 (Aug. 25, 2020),
https://governor.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/2008106-
CCH_Emergency-Order-No.-2020-25-distribution-signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Q7KB-DF6E ] (addressing resurgence of coronavirus in city under power granted
by city charter and Hawai’i revised statutes); Colo. Exec. Order. No. D 2020 178
(Sept. 5, 2020), https://www.colorado.gov/governor/sites/default/files/inline-
files/D%202020%20178-Protect%20Our%20Neighbors.pdf [https://perma.cc/
LW2T-YNHP ] (extending Executive Orders already in effect restricting daily busi-
ness under authority of Colo. Disaster Emergency Act, C.R.S. § 24-33.5-701); Miss.
Exec. Order No. 1522 (Sept. 13, 2020), sos.ms.gov/content/executiveorders/Ex-
ecutiveOrders/1522.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6BJ-M64N] (extending limited ca-
pacities and reopening procedures and limiting group gatherings pursuant to
Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-11(b)(17)); N.C. Exec. Order No. 163 (Sept. 1, 2020),
https://files.nc.gov/governor/documents/files/EO163-New-Phase-2.5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4Y6N-H6ZE ] (requiring face coverings in public facilities pur-
suant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 166A-19.10(b)(2) (2020)); N.D. Exec. Order No. 2020-
02.3 (July 28, 2020), https://www.health.nd.gov/sites/www/files/documents/
Files/MSS/coronavirus/State%20Health%20Officer%20Orders/2020-02.3_Inter-
national_Travel.pdf [https://perma.cc/QT9U-VYQR ] (mandating quarantine for
travelers entering North Dakota pursuant to N.D. Cent. Code Adv. Legis. Serv.
§ 23-01-05.1(West 2012)); N.J. Exec. Order No. 173 (Aug. 3, 2020), nj.gov/in-
fobank/eo/056murphy/pdf/EO-173.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SQ7-DXT3] (re-
scinding numerical limits for outdoor gatherings and maintaining all other
requirements set forth to mitigate spread of virus pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ App.A: 9-33 (1953)); R.I. Exec. Order No. 20-67 (Aug. 28, 2020), https://gover-
nor.ri.gov/documents/orders/Executive-Order-20-67.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J46Q-RGB9 ] (extending travel restrictions for domestic travelers and expanding
indoor gatherings to fifteen people or less pursuant to 23 R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-8-
4)).
69. See Government Response to Covid-19, USAGOV (last updated Aug. 26, 2020),
https://www.usa.gov/coronavirus [https://perma.cc/4EM3-YERR] (defining
CDC’s health information regarding coronavirus in U.S. response to pandemic).
70. See Bobby Allyn & Barbara Sprunt, Poll: As Coronavirus Spreads, Fewer Ameri-
cans See Pandemic as a Real Threat, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 17, 2020), https://
www.npr.org/2020/03/17/816501871/poll-as-coronavirus-spreads-fewer-ameri-
cans-see-pandemic-as-a-real-threat [https://perma.cc/A7K5-MAC9] (reporting
about fifty-six percent of Americans “consider the coronavirus a ‘real threat’” and
that growing number of Americans think it is “blown out of proportion”).
13
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back, first to March 26, then to the middle of May, then to early
July, until the first pitch of the season was thrown on July 23,
2020.71  The continued delays were the result of ongoing concerns
for player safety, compounded by the MLB/MLBPA’s futile negotia-
tions.72  The parties went through several rounds of negotiations
beyond the time frame of stay-at-home orders in an attempt to
reach an agreement independent of the 2017-2021 CBA to govern
the 2020 season.73  Once these negotiations stalled, Commissioner
Rob Manfred ultimately imposed a schedule to finalize the 2020
Agreement.74
2. Negotiating the Final “Agreement”
Early on in the MLB’s 2020 Agreement negotiations spurred by
the pandemic, both the MLB and the MLBPA were optimistic about
the outlook of negotiations for a season workable during the
coronavirus pandemic.75  The new agreement was negotiated by
MLBPA Executive Director Tony Clark on behalf of all players.76
On March 26, 2020, the two parties actually reached an agreement
that laid out the framework for a 2020 season, though the basic
2020 Agreement did little to prevent future difficult negotiations
which ultimately extended beyond the initial delay caused by the
71. See Perry et. al., supra note 8 (indicating each announced date during ne-
gotiations for potential game play as MLB owners and players pushed forward with
play as soon as feasible).
72. See id. (tracking each new start date announced by MLB and MLBPA).
73. See Passan & McDaniel, supra note 4 (reviewing difficult terms of
negotiations).
74. See id. (indicating continuously pushed back start date was caused by com-
bination of delays associated with positive coronavirus tests and difficult negotia-
tions, ending in stalemate).  Such a stalemate, as occurred between the MLB and
the MLBPA, was the purpose behind giving Commissioner Manfred the power to
force a season, so long as players received prorated salaries. See Dayn Perry, Why
MLB’s 2020 Season will Still be Played Despite Labor Fight; And When the Schedule Could
Start, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (June 15, 2020), https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/
news/why-mlbs-2020-season-will-still-be-played-despite-labor-fight-and-when-the-
schedule-could-start/ [https://perma.cc/7FPK-ZQDS ] (explaining negotiations
from March 26 giving Commissioner Manfred power to mandate 2020 season as
imperfect option for both players and owners, but best option for getting game
play in this season).
75. See Silverman, supra note 11 (noting harmony between players and own-
ers, which allowed parties to form 2020 Agreement quickly, dissipated once it was
clear there would be no revenue from fans).
76. See Dave Sheinin, MLB, Union Appear within Reach of a Deal for 2020 Season
After Owners Concede on Prorated Salaries, WASH. POST (June 17, 2020), (noting
MLBPA has acknowledged power it gave to Commissioner to enforce terms of
2020 season so long as players were paid their full prorated salaries).
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coronavirus pandemic and ended in a stalemate.77  The basic terms
of the 2020 Agreement dictated three main features of the season’s
framework, including that players would receive one hundred per-
cent of their prorated salaries based on the number of games
played in the 2020 season, that the MLB Commissioner would have
the right to implement a schedule for the season if one could not
be agreed upon, and finally that the MLB would make best efforts
to play as many games as possible.78
Unfortunately, these initial terms did not pave the way for a
fast or smooth negotiation process.79  The ten-week negotiations
between owners and players extended beyond the delay caused by
the coronavirus, and ended in a stalemate when the number of
games played and the compensation per game became sticking
points between the two parties.80  Players wanted to fit as many
games as possible into the shortened season, in light of their pro-
rated salary structure for the season.81  The players suspected, and
the owners’ behavior suggested, that owners wanted to avoid too
high a number of games for the same reason – fewer games played
77. See Tim Stebbins, Rob Manfred Guarantees a 2020 MLB Season, With or With-
out Agreement, NBC SPORTS CHI. (June 10, 2020) https://www.nbcsports.com/chi-
cago/cubs/rob-manfred-guarantees-2020-mlb-season-or-without-agreement
[https://perma.cc/R3C2-PK8P ] (reporting Manfred’s stance as of June that own-
ers hoped to avoid falling back to March agreement to impose mandated season,
but it would be done if necessary).  After the 2020 Agreement, owners wanted to
reopen the term guaranteeing players a full prorated salary if a season is mandated
on account of a clause allowing change if games were to be played without fans.
See id. (noting owners want players to share revenue losses); see also Silverman,
supra note 11 (identifying clause as “vaguely worded” to allow for discussion of
feasibility issues of paying players prorated salaries if stadiums remained closed).
78. See Silverman, supra note 11 (suggesting owners attempted to back out of
term promising players prorated salaries due to expected revenue losses from
empty stadiums).
79. See Perry et. al., supra note 8 (marking dates between initial agreement on
March 26 and final announcement of league owners’ vote to impose season on
June 22).
80. See Silverman, supra note 11 (tracking offers and counteroffers between
owners and players in negotiations just prior to Commissioner Manfred’s an-
nouncement of imposed sixty-game season).  The owners’ offers began at eighty-
two games, which players countered with 114 games.  See id. (noting owners stead-
ily decreased number of games in their offers and never included full pro rata
salaries, whereas players continually countered with full pro rata pay and higher
number of games played).  The owners’ final offer was a sixty-game season at fully
prorated salaries, and this is the schedule the Commissioner imposed after the
MLBPA rejected the sixty-game offer. See id. (noting final offer was lowest number
of games MLB offered to players).
81. See Perry, supra note 74 (describing forced season as less than ideal for
both parties, for players in particular because they want longest regular season
possible, considering salaries are tied to number of games played).
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meant less money the owners had to put towards players’ salaries.82
Due to the inability of the parties to agree on the length of the 2020
season, the MLBPA cut off negotiations, forcing Commissioner Rob
Manfred to impose a 2020 schedule consisting of sixty games.83
In the background of ongoing negotiations for the compensa-
tion framework for 2020, players and owners made progress on
other necessary terms such as the health and safety protocols play-
ers followed to accommodate the CDC’s recommendations for
coronavirus mitigation.84  These health and safety protocols in-
cluded precautions such as closing water fountains, prohibiting
sunflower seeds in the dugout, discouraging high-fives, and discour-
aging players from showering at the stadium.85  Health and safety
protocols notwithstanding, players continued to test positive, which
resulted in the postponement of games.86
Another consequence of increasing positive coronavirus cases
among the public and MLB players was the decision of some players
to opt out of the 2020 season altogether.87  Players who opted out
82. See Silverman, supra note 11 (suggesting owners dragged out negotiations
so that if they were forced to give players full pro rata pay, MLB’s season would be
significantly shorter and total loss of revenue to pay players’ salaries would be
“suitable”).
83. See Hoynes, MLB Owners, Players Force 2020 Season Upon Us Not by Agreement,
but by Disagreement, CLEVELAND.COM (June 23, 2020), https://www.cleveland.com/
tribe/2020/06/mlb-owners-players-force-2020-season-upon-us-not-by-agreement-
but-by-disagreement.html [https://perma.cc/G3CF-A4T2 ] (highlighting Manfred
did not fully unilaterally impose MLB season, just scheduling and prorated salary
terms players and owners could not agree on); see also Scott Lauber, Players’ Union
Cuts off ‘Futile’ Negotiations with MLB, Asks Commissioner to Impose Season, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER (June 13, 2020), https://www.inquirer.com/phillies/mlb-players-labor-ne-
gotiations-tony-clark-rob-manfred-2020-season-20200613.html [https://perma.cc/
3VXM-MFFD ] (recognizing MLB’s last proposal called for seventy-two game sea-
son with seventy percent of prorated pay for players, which disregarded players’
position against negotiating another pay reduction).
84. See Jabari Young, MLB Bans Players from Spitting and Adds Hitting Position in
New Coronavirus Rules, CNBC (July 29, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/
29/mlb-releases-new-coronavirus-rules-for-season-restart.html [https://perma.cc/
QMB9-FPE4 ] (comparing health and safety protocols to previous rules of baseball
and noting “unique features” of MLB’s 2020 season such as formalizing no spitting
and introducing the designated hitter’s position in the National League for 2020
season).
85. See Loede, supra note 13 (discussing “highlights” of sixty-seven page health
and safety protocol presented to MLBPA by owners in order to safely reconvene
from baseball hiatus that began March 12, 2020).
86. See Perry et al., supra note 8 (reporting Commissioner Manfred’s expecta-
tion that players “need to do better” to prevent continued spread of coronavirus
throughout season).
87. See James Wagner & Marc Stein, As Sports Begin Reopening, Athletes Weigh the
Health Risks, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/23/
sports/coronavirus-athletes.html?action=click&module=related-
Links&pgtype=article [https://perma.cc/BQP4-X8AS] (commenting on
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because they were considered to be at higher risk for the
coronavirus were placed on the injured list, allowing these players
to accumulate service time and salaries for the season.88  However,
players not deemed as high-risk who opted out were considered to
have “forfeited” their season.89  This left them unable to receive pro
rata salaries or accumulate service time, which caused a larger issue
within accruing service time for salary arbitration.90  The expecta-
tion that non-high-risk players play when public life has changed to
accommodate public safety efforts created a stark division between
players who wanted to play as many games as possible and players
who opted out due to health concerns.91
Overall, players were not pleased with the 2020 Agreement, ei-
ther due to the potentially lower pro rata salaries, or the potential
forfeiture of player salaries if the player opted out and was not
deemed high-risk.92  The MLBPA’s grievances, which are sure to
coronavirus’s specific impact on athletes who have managed to succeed in profes-
sional sports while managing health conditions).
88. See James Wagner, Ryan Zimmerman, Ian Desmond and 2 Others Opt Out of
M.L.B. Season, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/
29/sports/baseball/ryan-zimmerman-nationals-opt-out.html?action=click&mod-
ule=relatedLinks&pgtype=article [https://perma.cc/3R7X-7UTM ] (explaining
while any player could opt out of MLB’s 2020 season, only athletes who have medi-
cal histories making them high-risk for coronavirus were eligible for service time
and pay while sitting out).
89. See id. (highlighting service time was unavailable to players who opted out
without high-risk health concerns).
90. See Alex Pavlovic, MLB Opt-Out Tracker: Every Player Who Has Declined to Play
2020 Season, NBC SPORTS (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.nbcsports.com/bayarea/
giants/mlb-opt-out-tracker-every-player-who-has-declined-play-2020-season [https:/
/perma.cc/U6F9-ZECR ] (tracking players who have sacrificed pay and service
time by deciding to sit out of 2020’s MLB season due to coronavirus concerns).
91. See Wagner, supra note 88 (analyzing players who choose to opt out of
2020 season without underlying health conditions were generally only highly suc-
cessful athletes who could afford to do it).  Ryan Zimmerman of the Washington
Nationals, for example, has made over $133 million and has won the World Series,
and this previous success provided Zimmerman with a decision to opt out of the
2020 season without receiving service time or pro rata pay that is not similarly
available to players just starting out or without the same financial success up to this
point in their careers. See id. (“[Deciding who to reassign or sit out for the season
is] about as difficult a decision all as you’re going to get in baseball.”).
92. See Silverman, supra note 11 (reporting MLBPA’s statement following
MLB proposal that “[The MLBPA] believe[s] [the owners’] position is part and
parcel of [the owners] general bad faith determination to play as few games as
possible to punish players for refusing to capitulate to MLB’s demands for massive
pay cuts.”); see also Diekman, supra note 15 (“Also, no offense, but I really don’t
care that Bob from wherever is bored at home with no sports and it’d be ‘good for
him’ to watch. Not at my husband’s expense . . . .”); John Perrotto, Money Helps
Drive Decision of Whether MLB Players Opt Out of Season, FORBES (July 7, 2020), https:/
/www.forbes.com/sites/johnperrotto/2020/07/07/money-helps-drive-decision-of-
whether-mlb-players-opt-out-of-season/#1191cbc5527f [https://perma.cc/UJ98-
SPFQ] (“Ultimately, [Pirates’s pitcher Trevor] Williams decided to play, and fi-
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come to light in 2021 negotiations for a new collective bargaining
agreement, are reflected in various legal arguments that the 2020
Agreement is unenforceable.93  For many players, the idea of a
forced season seemed outright unfair, or even a bad idea – to the
extent that some well-known players opted out of the season.94  Un-
fortunately for those players who could not afford to opt out, the
season was played with a massive reduction in salaries and contin-
ued positive coronavirus tests.95  The contract doctrines that allow
for termination of a contract, discussed below, are all fact-specific,
and depend on the circumstances surrounding the formation of
the contract and the individual parties to the contract.96
3. The 2020 Season
On “Opening Day” of the 2020 season on July 23, 2020, the
players showed up to work as scheduled.97  Although the players
complied with the imposed schedule, the MLBPA accused the own-
ers of negotiating in bad faith to secure a shorter season against the
wishes of players and the requirements of the 2020 Agreement’s
framework.98  Once players began working, they began testing posi-
tive for coronavirus.99  Not only did teams struggle to stay on the
nances were a major part of his decision. . . .‘[T]his is my livelihood and we
couldn’t afford to opt out.’”).
93. See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
§ 1:21 (4th ed. 1993) (defining unenforceable contracts as ones for which duty of
performance depends on legal consequences of contract, not on election of party
in contract); see also 35 ROBERT H. DIERKER & RICHARD J. MEHAN, MO. PRACTICE.
§ 12:8. (2020 ed.) (listing defenses for breach of contract including duress or un-
due influence, mistake, public policy, fraud, estoppel, unconscionability, adhesion,
and impossibility).  While it varies by state, most courts treat these contract doc-
trines as defenses for a breach of contract claim, as opposed to independent cause
of action. See id. (providing examples from various jurisdictions of doctrines as
defenses for breach of contract).
94. For a full discussion of players’ options to opt out of the 2020 season, see
supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
95. See Perry et al., supra note 8 (reporting statement made by Commissioner
Manfred about 2020 season and coronavirus that “I am not a quitter in general
and there is no reason to quit now. We have to be fluid, but it is manageable.”).
96. See, e.g., Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 919 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir.
1990), abrogated by In re Larry Doiron, Inc., 879 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Deter-
mination of the nature of a contract depends in part on historical treatment in the
jurisprudence and in part on a fact-specific inquiry.”).
97. See Silverman, supra note 11 (discussing contentious lead-up to opening
day).
98. See infra notes 245-246 for MLBPA Executive Director Tony Clark’s repre-
sentations that players want the longest season possible.
99. See Perry et al., supra note 8 (highlighting turbulent start for MLB’s new
spring training and beginning of season as players tested positive, delaying players’
return to camp).
18
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol28/iss2/7
2021] FORCED PLAY 517
field during “summer training,” but several games were cancelled
throughout the season because of players testing positive for
coronavirus.100
Despite the forty-five games that were postponed due to players
testing positive for coronavirus, the regular season ended with all
but two teams completing their full sixty-game season.101  In an ef-
fort to avoid further disruptions to game play in the postseason, the
MLB implemented bubble sites for the duration of the playoffs.102
The MLB and the MLBPA also agreed on an expanded postseason
for the playoffs, though this was more as a result of the financial
benefits to both parties than due to any sudden positive change in
the relationship between the two.103  The World Series was played
between the L.A. Dodgers and the Tampa Bay Rays, and for the first
time it was played in a neutral location – Globe Life Field in Arling-
ton, Texas.104  The L.A. Dodgers came away victorious in game six
100. See Mike Axisa & R.J. Anderson, MLB Schedule Has 43 Total Games Post-
poned Due to Positive COVID-19 Cases, CBS SPORTS (Sept. 15, 2020), https://
www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/mlb-schedule-has-43-total-games-postponed-due-to-
positive-covid-19-cases/ [https://perma.cc/E7KY-B7UZ ] (discussing MLB hopes
to make up all missed games with doubleheaders and by skipping rest days).
101. See MLB Standings 2020, ESPN, https://www.espn.com/mlb/standings
[https://perma.cc/9UJS-X9TV] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020) (reporting final stand-
ings for MLB’s regular season, showing Detroit Tigers and Washington Nationals
as only two teams with fewer than sixty games—both ended with fifty-eight games
played).
102. See MLB Postseason Games to be Played at Bubble Sites, Beginning with Division
Series, ESPN (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/29891648/
sources-mlb-mlbpa-agree-hold-playoffs-bubble-setting [https://perma.cc/59NR-
VECY ] (“[T]he bubble was preferred for the latter stages of the postseason, when
there is little time available for rescheduling.”).





%20the%20previous%20format [https://perma.cc/XA8A-G28J ] (“With only 60
regular-season games this year – and teams unable to sell tickets, at least initially –
owners had a strong interest in generating additional revenue by adding more
postseason games to sell to networks. The players, whose postseason bonuses ordi-
narily come from ticket sales, will get a $50 million pool to divide under the new
plan.”).  The MLB is also required to get the MLBPA’s approval for any changes to
the postseason, so the one-time expanded postseason for 2020 does not apply to
the 2021 negotiations for the new collective bargaining agreement. See id. (noting
requirement for player approval of expanded postseason as leverage in future
negotiations).
104. See World Series 2020: Schedules, Postseason Bracket, Analysis and Updates,
ESPN (Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/29955449/2020-
mlb-playoffs-schedules-postseason-bracket-analysis-updates [https://perma.cc/
EBK5-K3V7] (noting 2020’s World Series is scheduled at Globe Life Field in Ar-
lington, Texas, rather than at L.A. Dodgers’ or Tampa Bay Ray’s team parks in
California and Florida, respectively).
19
Young: Forced Play: Was the MLB Commisioner's Decision to Force a 2020 M
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021
518 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28: p. 499
of the World Series, but not without drama.105  After successfully
completing playoffs without any additional coronavirus cases, Dodg-
ers’ “pulse of the clubhouse” Justin Turner had to take a rapid
coronavirus test that came back positive during the seventh inning
of game six.106  Despite this, when the last strike was thrown to end
the ninth inning, Turner stormed the field with the rest of the
team, removing his mask and joining the huddle to celebrate the
wild accomplishment of winning the World Series in one of the
most difficult seasons the MLB has encountered .107  The scene was
described as “a superspreader event on live TV” and raised the
same concerns that have been expressed at large among the United
States public over what individual responsibilities are and what they
should be regarding the spread of coronavirus.108
III. WHAT THE MLB OWNERS MISSED: LOOPHOLES IN THE 2020
AGREEMENT THAT COULD HAVE EXCUSED MLBPA
PERFORMANCE
All of the complaints the MLBPA had throughout negotiations
for the 2020 Agreement raise the question of whether it was en-
forceable at all.109  To excuse performance, the MLBPA needed to
argue that one of the various contract doctrines created to protect
parties against oppressively unfair contracts is applicable to the
2020 Agreement.110  The arguments that were likely to be successful
were those that clearly reflected the MLBPA’s complaints surround-
ing the 2020 season and help to predict future consequences the
MLB may face come 2021 negotiations.111  These legal doctrines
include, but are not limited to, unconscionability, fraud, misrepre-
105. See Jeff Passan, World Series 2020: The Oddest of World Series Ends with the
Most 2020 Moment of the Season, ESPN (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.espn.com/
mlb/story/_/id/30202748/world-series-2020-oddest-world-series-ends-most-2020-
moment-season [https://perma.cc/XD26-FPWX ] (highlighting Dodgers’ win as
first in thirty-two years).
106. See id. (describing Turner’s inconclusive tests over previous two days, re-
sulting in decision to expedite Turner’s latest test during game six of World
Series).
107. See id. (describing Turner passing World Series trophy among teammates
and sitting next to Dodgers’ manager, diagnosed with cancer, unmasked and smil-
ing with team over their achievement).
108. See id. (reporting description of “superspreader event” from one un-
named general manager).
109. For further discussion of the difficulties negotiating the 2020 Agree-
ment, see supra notes 79-83, 87-91 and accompanying text.
110. For further discussion of some of the legal doctrines providing relief
from unfair contracts, see infra notes 118-165 and accompanying text.
111. For further discussion of some of the legal doctrines providing relief
from unfair contracts, see infra notes 118-165 and accompanying text.
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sentation, undue influence, duress, declaring a contract void as
against public policy, and a violation of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.112
While the 2020 MLB season was played successfully, the con-
tract doctrines that the MLBPA could have argued in a breach of
contract suit are useful because they not only reflect the grievances
the MLBPA is likely to bring up during negotiations for the upcom-
ing 2021 collective bargaining agreement, but also mirror the
“costs” the MLB is likely to pay for its forced season regardless of
the successful season.113  A lack of enforceability due to a violation
of public policy translates into the decision of some players to opt
out of the 2020 season.114  Unconscionability translates into the un-
fairness of owners continually asking players to sacrifice huge pay
cuts, something players will rely on when refusing to concede on
terms come 2021 colletive bargaining agreement negotaitions.115
Undue influence translates into the Commissioner’s imposed
schedule based on the owners’ last offer as opposed to a compro-
mise, something that reinforces the idea that the owners have
“won” the last several agreement negotiations.116  These doctrines,
assessed below in this Section, highlight the negotiation tactics and
decisions that the MLBPA will point to in order to negotiate more
favorable terms during the 2021 collective bargaining negotiations
– something the MLB should have considered prior to forcing a
season according to the last offer made by owners.117
A. Violation of Public Policy
Public policy is an ambiguous and difficult to define term, re-
sulting in varying definitions throughout the years by the judicial
112. For further discussion of some of the legal doctrines providing relief
from unfair contracts, see infra notes 118-165 and accompanying text.
113. For further discussion of court’s ability to invalidate a contract to provide
equitable relief, see infra notes 173-174 and accompanying text.
114. For further discussion of the MLBPA’s argument that the 2020 Agree-
ment violated public policy and how it reflects their likely grievances in 2021 nego-
tiations, see infra notes 169-211 and accompanying text.
115. For further discussion of the MLBPA’s argument that the 2020 Agree-
ment violated unconscionability and how it reflects their likely grievances in 2021
negotiations, see infra notes 212-250 and accompanying text.
116. For further discussion of the MLBPA’s argument that the 2020 Agree-
ment arose from undue influence and how it reflects their likely grievances in 2021
negotiations, see infra notes 251-261 and accompanying text.
117. For further discussion of MLBPA’s dissatisfaction with both the 2020
Agreement and the 2017-2021 CBA, see infra notes 275-276 and accompanying
text; see also supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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system.118  One of the foremost treatises on contracts defines public
policy as “flexible and variable, depending on the precise issue
before the court,” a vague definition that reflects the elusiveness of
defining public policy in common law.119  This definition can be
seen in court opinions across jurisdictions, such as the Oklahoma
Supreme Court’s description of the power to invalidate a contract
against public policy as “a very delicate and undefined power” in
Huber v. Culp.120
Another treatise on contracts defines the test to determine
whether a contract is against public policy by weighing a contract
term’s enforcement against public policy interests.121  However, this
balancing test is rarely used by courts, and the more heavily relied
upon definition is the more amorphous one, used in cases such as
Kelley as Trustee for PCI Liquidating Trust v. Boosalis,122 in which pub-
lic policy, to be truly defined, depends upon the exact subject mat-
ter of a case.123  Additionally, courts are hesitant to put too fine a
definition on public policy when assessing the validity of a contract,
118. See Farshad Ghodoosi, Article: The Concept of Public Policy in Law: Revisiting
the Role of the Public Policy Doctrine in the Enforcement of Private Legal Arrangements, 94
NEB. L. REV. 685, 688 (2016) (speculating courts have been unwilling to define
public policy because it carries more authority for courts undefined than defined,
as public policy is vague and covers vast subject matter).
119. 15 ARTHUR L. CORBIN & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 79.3 (revised ed. 1983).  A scholar analyzed that, while specific in his categoriza-
tion of 128 “sub-species” of public policy defenses, Corbin’s definition “leaves the
impression that the defense is dependent on the minutiae of every conceivable
underlying subject matter addressed in a public policy case.”  David A. Friedman,
Bringing Order to Contracts Against Public Policy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563, 572
(2012) (providing systematic analysis of public policy defense case law).  Friedman
discusses the lack of literature defining public policy beyond Corbin’s vague defini-
tion, determining whether the area of public policy in contract law is “unruly.” See
id. at 565 (citing Richardson v. Mellish, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (Eng. 1824)) (cred-
iting Judge Burrough’s phrasing of public policy as “unruly” as most famous
description of public policy in contract law).
120. 149 P. 216, 219 (Okla. 1915) (stating party claiming violation of public
policy to invalidate contract will only meet burden when party shows contract term
is injurious to public or in violation of settled policy of State).
121. See Friedman, supra note 119, at 576 (noting Williston’s approach of bal-
ancing test to determine whether contract is against public policy (citing 15 SA-
MUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12:2 (4th ed.
1993))).
122. 974 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2020).
123. See Friedman, supra note 119, at 576 (questioning utility of balancing test
due to its lack of use in cases analyzed); see, e.g., Kelley as Trustee for PCI Liquidat-
ing Trust, 974 F.3d 884, 894 (8th Cir. 2020) (defining contracts against public
policy in Minnesota as contracts illegal or injurious to public’s interests); Pyle v.
Kernan, 36 P.2d 580, 583 (Or. 1934) (defining main factor that makes contracts
invalid as against public policy as “evil tendencies”). But see Rogers v. Webb, 558
N.W.2d 155, 157 (Iowa 1997) (discussing Iowa’s precedential reliance on balanc-
ing test from Restatement Second on Contracts).
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for fear it will restrict the general authority conferred to courts to
apply public policy without a clear definition.124  More importantly,
as stated by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Zeitz v. Foley,125 courts
invalidate contracts against public policy cautiously, because the
doctrine is used to ensure contracts are not performed in violation
of law or state policy, not to “enable parties to escape their
obligations.”126
A court may invalidate a contract as against public policy
through multiple avenues, though usually they can be understood
as one of two – the first and more easily established being when a
contract functions to violate statutory language.127  Second, and
much less defined, a party may demonstrate that a contract goes
against the “morals” of the public, the morals generally being those
of the state in which the dispute occurs as seen in Baugh v. Novak.128
In Baugh, the court recognized the traditional path for discerning
public policy, in which courts begin by looking to any statutes or
regulations in place to determine whether a contract is contrary to
public policy, as that is the most clear method for recognizing and
applying a state’s public policy.129  In the event that no such statutes
or policies exist, as was the case in Huber, courts undertake the
vague determination of whether the contract runs contrary to the
policy of the state according to indicators such as public morals.130
124. See Ghodoosi, supra note 118, at 699 (attributing court’s unwillingness to
solidly define public policy in part to belief that defining public policy is at discre-
tion of legislature and would be judicial activism if courts were to do so). But see
Black Indus., Inc. v. Bush, 110 F. Supp. 801, 804 (D. N.J. 1953) (citing court’s
historic refusal to “await legislative action” in vague public policy areas).
Ghodoosi’s attribution of vague definitions to a deference to the legislature is in
addition to Ghodoosi’s analysis that courts are unwilling to limit their own power.
See Ghodoosi, supra note 118, at 689 (noting clearly delineated public policy doc-
trine reduces power of judges and arbitrators).
125. 264 S.W.2d 267 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954).
126. See id. at 268.
127. See Hamilton v. Cash, 91 P.2d 80, 81 (Okla. 1939) (finding contract ille-
gal where consideration in exchange for performance in form of illegal marble
machines was contrary to public policy).
128. See Baugh v. Novak, 340 S.W.3d 372, 384 (Tenn. 2011) (determining
public morals are determined through state’s constitution, statutes enacted by
state legislature, common law, and prior decisions); see also Zerjal v. Daech & Bauer
Const., Inc., 939 N.E.2d 1067, 1072 (Ill. Ct. App. 2010) (stating contracts are
against public policy where they contradict interest of society, interfere with public
welfare or safety, or are injurious to public interest).
129. See Baugh, 340 S.W.3d at 385 (noting clearest source of public policy for
determining contracts unconscionable is prohibition of action by statute or state
legislature’s express purposes behind statute).
130. See Huber v. Culp, 149 P.2d 216, 218 (Okla. 1915) (relying on state con-
stitution, state laws, and judicial decisions to determine public morals when no law
was directly on point).
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However, some courts, such as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
will only declare a contract against public policy when “there is a
virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to [the policy] that the court
may constitute itself the voice of the community in so declaring
. . . .”131  Contracts are also void across jurisdictions if the purpose
behind the contract or any act required to perform the contract is
illegal.132  The applicable argument against the 2020 Agreement
under an affirmative defense of violation of public policy reflects
the issues the MLBPA has about player safety and forcing players to
sacrifice pay and service time to opt out, which the MLBPA is likely
to bring up in negotiations for a new collective bargaining
agreement.133
B. Unconscionability
Another potential defense against contractual performance
that highlights the MLBPA’s grievances over the 2020 season is the
doctrine of unconscionability, in which the terms of a contract are
more than unfair – rather they are terms “such as no man in his
senses and not under a delusion would make on the one hand, and
as no honest and fair man would accept on the other.”134  In deter-
mining whether a contract is such that no person would make or
accept it, a court assesses for both procedural and substantive un-
conscionability.135  As shown in Moore v. Woman to Woman Obstetrics
& Gynecology, L.L.C.,136 both forms of unconscionability are gener-
131. Mamlin v. Genoe, 17 A.2d 407, 409 (Pa. 1941).
132. See Zeitz v. Foley, 264 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954) (stating con-
tracts are invalid when connected to illegal purpose and inseparable from that
purpose, but finding contract at issue consistent with public policy where defen-
dant had two businesses, one illegal and one legal, and contract was for sale of
assets of legal business).
133. For further discussion of the MLBPA’s potential arguments and likely
success of those arguments, see infra notes 177-211 and accompanying text.
134. Sanderson v. Sanderson, 170. So. 3d 430, 436 (Miss. 2014) (quoting
Terre Haute Cooperage, Inc. v. Branscome, 35 So. 2d 537 (Miss. 1948)) (holding
unconscionability has been expanded by courts from its original application to
sales contracts to broad arrays of contracts including arbitration contracts and do-
mestic relations contracts); see also Ketler v. PFPA, LLC., 132 A.3d 746, 748 (Del.
2016) (holding waivers releasing gym from all liability for user’s injury was not
unconscionable because plaintiff could walk away from contract and not use gym);
Smith v. Harrison, 325 N.W.2d 92, 94 (Iowa 1982) (holding unconscionability does
not exist merely to rescue parties from bad bargains).
135. See 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
§ 18:10 (4th ed. 1993) (differentiating between procedural unconscionability and
substantive unconscionability and noting that finding unconscionability generally
requires both procedural and substantive unconscionability, despite its original
purpose to combat both forms of unfairness).
136. 3 A.3d 535 (N.J. Super. 2010).
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ally required to declare a contract unconscionable, though they can
be viewed on a sliding scale, so that the stronger one form of un-
conscionability, the less support is needed for the other.137
First, procedural unconscionability refers to circumstances dur-
ing the formation of the contract that would indicate unfairness
extreme enough to remove fair choice from one party.138  Often,
when analyzing negotiations for procedural unconscionability,
courts will assess the bargaining power of the parties, as occurred in
Associated Estates LLC v. Bank Atlantic.139  Generally, bargaining
power is an indicator of unconscionability where one party is less
sophisticated and therefore easier to take advantage of, or where
the relationship between parties limits one party’s power or lever-
age during negotiations.140  Another circumstance the court looked
to when assessing procedural unconscionability in Navellier v. Slet-
ten141 was the ability of the parties to freely reject the agreement, a
factor not unrelated to the parties’ bargaining power.142  This can
include the parties’ involvement in drafting the agreement, or it
can result from unequal bargaining power such that the weaker
party feels forced to accept the agreement.143  Finally, courts will
assess whether the terms are surprising to the weaker party due to
137. See id. at 540 (“[U]nconscionability involves two factors: (1) unfairness in
the formation of the contract [procedural unconscionability] and (2) excessively
disproportionate terms [substantive unconscionability]” (quoting Sitogum Hold-
ings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.3d 915, 921 (N.J. Ch. Div. 2002))); see also Chen-Oster v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 449 F. Supp. 3d 216, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (referring to
unconscionability factors on sliding scale in which no single factor is
determinative).
138. See Newell v. SCI Ala. Funeral Servs. 233 So. 3d 326, 334 (Ala. 2017)
(providing examples of procedural unconscionability, including deception or re-
fusal to bargain, and whether parties were given meaningful choice).
139. 164 A.3d 932, 943 (D.C. Ct. App. 2017) (explaining when assessing
whether one party had meaningful choice, courts look to bargaining power, ability
to understand contract terms, parties’ expertise, and timeframe of negotiations);
Blanchard v. Blanchard, 148 A.3d 277, 283 (Me. 2016) (including unequal bar-
gaining power and lack of understanding as factors for determining procedural
unconscionability (citing Barrett v. McDonald Invs., Inc., 870 A.2d 146 (Me.
2005))).
140. See 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 135, at § 18:10 (noting further fac-
tors of unconscionability include hidden or misleading fine print, extensive legal
language, differences in each party’s sophistication, and lack of opportunity to ask
about contract terms).
141. 262 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2001).
142. See id. at 940 (finding no unconscionability where plaintiff “freely chose
to waive his legal rights in order to preserve the stability of the Fund . . . was well-
represented by counsel, and . . . had adequate time to pursue other alternatives”).
143. See Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (“When the weaker party is presented the clause and told to ‘take it or leave
it’ without the opportunity for meaningful negotiation, oppression, and therefore
procedural unconscionability, are present.”).
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hidden language drafted by the other party.144  As can be seen in
Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,145 courts will undertake a fact
specific analysis of the negotiations surrounding the agreement
when assessing these factors.146
The second form of unconscionability, substantive unconscio-
nability, looks to the terms of a contract to determine whether the
substance of the agreement terms is fair for the parties.147  Courts
find a contract substantively unconscionable when the contract is
excessively oppressive or includes harsh terms favoring one party.148
However, as seen in Torricillas v. Fitness International, LLC,149 courts
will not find substantive unconscionability without oppression or
harshly one-sided terms.150  When determining whether an agree-
ment is oppressive or harsh towards one party, courts look to the
“mores and business practices of the time and place” to determine
whether the terms of the agreement are so unreasonable as to be
unenforceable.151  In addition to the comparison courts may make
to business practices within the industry in which the contract at
issue was made, some courts also assess factors such as fairness of
contract terms and the ability to predict future liability.152  Addi-
tionally, courts have clearly stated that in the event of a dispute,
substantive unconscionability is judged from the time of the con-
144. See 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 135, at § 18:10 (noting any procedu-
ral unconscionability, including surprise, must culminate in substantively uncon-
scionable terms to satisfy both prongs of unconscionability).
145. 449 F. Supp. 3d 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
146. See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 449 F. Supp. 3d 216, 247
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (describing inquiry into procedural unconscionability as flexible,
and “‘intended to be sensitive to the realities and nuances of the bargaining pro-
cess’” (quoting Bernardino v. Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Inc., No.17 Civ. 4570,
2017 WL 730893, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)), report and recommendation adopted, No. 17
Civ. 4570, 2018 WL 671258 (S.D.N.Y 2018) (quoting Gillman v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 534 N.E.2d 824 (1988))).
147. See WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 135, at § 18:10 (noting in context of
Uniform Commercial Code, common examples of substantive unconscionability
are boilerplate language that alters duties otherwise imposed by law, contracts of
adhesion that negate reasonable expectations of non-drafting party, or unexpect-
edly harsh terms related to central aspect of agreement).
148. See id. (noting court will ask whether stronger party overreached and
gained “unjust and undeserved advantage”).
149. 266 Cal. Rptr. 3d 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020).
150. See id. at 188-89 (holding arbitration was not substantively unconsciona-
ble where agreement did not shock court’s conscience, was not oppressive, and
included standard terms for contract in that industry).
151. Chen-Oster, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 250 (citation omitted).
152. See Eastham v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 754 F.3d 356, 366 (6th
Cir. 2014) (noting that there are no “bright-line” factors to weigh when assessing
substantive unconscionability in Ohio, and that factors courts use vary based on
terms of agreement at issue).
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tract’s formation, not at the time of the dispute.153  Unconscionabil-
ity is another contract doctrine that reflects the unfairness the
MLBPA will likely highlight in 2021 negotiations.154
C. Undue Influence
A third contract doctrine that reflects the MLBPA’s feelings to-
wards the owners conduct during 2020 negotiations, undue influ-
ence, is similar to procedural unconscionability in that one party
had significant power over the other at the time of the contract’s
formation.155  One common definition of undue influence is “ex-
cessive persuasion that causes another person to act or refrain from
acting by overcoming that person’s free will and results in ineq-
uity.”156  However, unlike procedural unconscionability, undue in-
fluence has elements which must be met.157  Generally, as seen in
Miller v. Westwood,158 courts look for four factors that the party
claiming undue influence must show for the affirmative defense to
be successful.159  The first element of undue influence, as defined
by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Goff v. Weeks,160 requires that
there be a party subject to influence.161  Second, also exemplified
153. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448-49 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (explicitly expanding Uniform Commercial Code provision defining
unconscionability at time of contract creation to apply in D.C. common law).  The
court noted that the Uniform Commercial Code was not made contradictory to
common law, and that it therefore does not preclude the court from applying a
similar rule in common law. See id. (stating without prior authority applying rule
in common law, court would still rely on code as persuasive authority).
154. For further discussion of the MLBPA’s potential arguments and likely
success of those arguments, see infra notes 215-250 and accompanying text.
155. See Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 940 (9th Cir. 2001) (assessing
whether party could freely reject agreement as factor of procedural unconsciona-
bility); DIERKER & MEHAN, supra note 93, at § 12.8 (asserting central determination
of undue influence is whether contract resulted from force or coercion).
156. 2 ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, CAL. AFF. DEFENSES § 46:1 (2d Ed.) (quoting
California Welfare and Institutions Code § 15610.70(a)).
157. See id. (defining elements of undue influence in state of California).  For
further discussion of the factors of procedural unconscionability, including the
lack of any “bright-line” factors, see supra notes 138-146 and accompanying text.
158. 472 N.W.2d. 903 (Neb. 1991).
159. See id. at 912 (defining four elements of undue influence (citing
Pickman v. Pickman, 505 A.2d 4, 7 (Conn. Ct. App. 1986); Craig v. Kile, 392
N.W.2d 340, 344 (Neb. 1983)). But see Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. Beckner, 597
S.E.2d 34, 38 (Va. 2004) (defining Virginia’s recognition of undue influence as
“weakness of mind and grossly inadequate consideration or suspicious circum-
stances are shown or when a confidential relationship is established” between the
adverse party and the drafter of the instrument).
160. 517 N.W.2d 387, 392 (Neb. 1994).
161. See id. at 392 (holding weaker party was susceptible to undue influence
because party was hospitalized and needed assistance from stronger party, includ-
ing granting power of attorney); Pickman, 505 A.2d at 7 (determining factors indi-
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in Goff, there must be an opportunity to exercise undue influence
on the part of the more powerful party.162  Third, the Goff court
required that the party claiming undue influence must show that
the adverse party had a disposition to exercise undue influence for
an improper purpose.163  Finally, for the doctrine to apply, the re-
sult of the first three factors must have an effect of exercised undue
influence as was tested in Miller.164  While similar to procedural un-
conscionability, the MLBPA could rely on the undue influence doc-
trine to highlight the negotiation tactics during 2020 negotiations
that it feels was unfair.165
These contract doctrines were created for the express purpose
of protecting parties against unfair contracts, and while the 2020
season was successfully played without any attempt by the MLBPA
to excuse performance under the contract, the doctrines still reflect
serious concerns the players had.166  Additionally, while it is un-
likely a court would have excused performance for the MLBPA
under the 2020 Agreement, they represent the same arguments the
MLB undervalued during 2020 Agreement negotiations, an over-
sight that will likely cost the MLB come 2021 negotiations.167  The
following section of this Comment articulates in detail the argu-
ments the MLBPA would make under each of the above-defined
doctrines, and Part V outlines the ‘costs’ of the negotiations that
gave rise to the MLB’s complaints.168
cating susceptibility to being influenced include physical and mental condition of
party alleging it was influenced).
162. See, e.g., Goff, 517 N.W.2d at 392 (holding there was opportunity to exer-
cise undue influence as result of stronger party’s power of attorney on behalf of
weaker party).
163. See id. (suggesting attempts to keep others from discussing issue with
weaker party is evidence of intent to exercise undue influence).
164. See Miller, 472 N.W.2d. 903, 912 (Neb. 1991) (finding some evidence of
influence existed but that it did not have effect of undue influence because weaker
party’s action was voluntary).
165. For further discussion of the MLBPA’s potential arguments and likely
success of those arguments, see infra notes 254-261 and accompanying text.
166. For full discussion of players’ concerns about untrustworthiness of own-
ers, see supra notes 11, 34, 79-83 and accompanying text.
167. For full discussion of why the MLBPA’s potential arguments would not
excuse performance, see infra notes 204-209, 249, 260-261 and accompanying text.
168. For full discussion of the MLBPA’s arguments under a public policy ar-
gument, see infra notes 180-211 and accompanying text.  For full discussion of the
MLBPA’s arguments under an unconscionability argument, see infra notes 215-250
and accompanying text.  For full discussion of the MLBPA’s arguments under an
undue influence argument, see infra notes 254-261 and accompanying text.
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IV. FOUL TIP: HOW THE MLB NARROWLY ESCAPED LEGAL
DISPUTES THAT WOULD HAVE PUT AN END TO THE 2020
SEASON
The 2020 MLB season was fraught with hostile negotiations,
setbacks in the form of positive tests, and revenue loss from the lack
of fans.169  The terms of the 2020 Agreement seemed unfair to play-
ers, because they forced a decision between opting out of a season
(and a salary) or accepting a higher risk of contracting
coronavirus.170  It is clear from the hostility between the parties dur-
ing negotiations and the resulting stalemate that forcing a season
will have harsh results come the upcoming collective bargaining ne-
gotiations in 2021.171  However, it has been unclear to this point
whether the terms were just unfair, or whether they were so unfair
or violative of public policy that they were unenforceable, which
would provide the MLB with greater leverage during 2021 negotia-
tions for the new collective bargaining agreements.172
The answer to whether the 2020 Agreement was unenforceable
is up to courts, which have the ability to declare a contract unen-
forceable where it is necessary to create equitable relief.173  For
these arguments to succeed, the MLB’s conduct when creating the
2020 Agreement would need to have violated one of the contract
doctrines that regulate fairness and public policy.174  The MLBPA’s
169. See Gabe Lacques, MLB Players Who Have Tested Positive for Coronavirus,
USA TODAY SPORTS (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.msn.com/en-us/sports/mlb/
mlb-players-who-have-tested-positive-for-coronavirus-list-of-covid-19-cases-in-base-
ball/ar-BB16us5S [https://perma.cc/G9EH-4CTR ] (reporting list of 104 positive
cases made public from MLB rosters within three weeks of official start of season
on July 23).
170. See, e.g., Perrotto, supra note 92 (featuring quotes from players weighing
options of giving up annual salary or exposing loved ones to additional risk of
contracting coronavirus).
171. For a discussion of the expectation that hostility will be visible during
2021 negotiations, see infra notes 273-283, 318 and accompanying text.
172. For a discussion of the application of unconscionability to the MLBPA’s
case, see infra notes 215-250 and accompanying text.
173. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 358 (Am. L. Inst. 1981) (giv-
ing courts wide flexibility to use remedies at equity to provide full relief for injured
party).  The federal circuits have drawn from and explicitly relied on the Restate-
ment of Contracts as it often reflects interpretation principles. See Richard L.
Revesz, Restatements and the Federal Common Law, AM. L. INST. (Sept. 27, 2016),
https://www.ali.org/news/articles/restatements-and-federal-common-law/
[https://perma.cc/GR6G-ZELB ] (providing several examples across areas of law
where courts rely on restatements of law).
174. See WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 135, at § 18:1 (framing historical de-
velopment of unconscionability as protection for parties accused of breach in
court against modern use in Uniform Commercial Code and common law con-
tracts).  Equitable relief such as public policy or unconscionability usually arise as
an affirmative defense in another cause of action, as opposed to creating a distinct
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potential arguments and their potential outcomes, laid out by con-
tract doctrine below, provide insight into the arguments players will
make when refusing to give in on terms during 2021 negotia-
tions.175  Part A discusses whether the MLB’s decision to play vio-
lates public policy, Part B discusses whether the contract terms for
the 2020 Agreement were unconscionable, and Part C discusses
whether the MLB exercised undue influence.176
A. Did the MLB’s Decision to Play Violate Public Policy?
The first defense available in a contracts dispute that the play-
ers could use to highlight owners’ unfair negotiating is that the re-
sulting contract was in violation of public policy.177  The lack of
enforceability of contracts contrary to public policy serves to regu-
late agreements that are against the values of the public.178  The
ability of courts to invalidate contracts that function counter to pub-
lic policy is longstanding, though unfortunately public policy as a
doctrine for invalidating contracts is ill-defined, making it difficult
to predict how a court would decide a potential dispute.179
1. Did the Agreement Itself Violate Public Policy?
In order to determine whether the MLB’s continuation of a
season during the coronavirus pandemic violates public policy, a
court would first need to assess what public policy is in place sur-
rounding the coronavirus pandemic and whether precautions to
limit transmission represent such a “virtual unanimity of opinion”
that the court may act as the voice of the community.180  The court
cause of action under which players could sue. See id. (providing case law applying
equitable relief as affirmative defense rather than cause of action).
175. For further discussion of a potential lockout during the 2021 collective
bargaining agreement due to distrust and animosity between players and owners,
see infra notes 275-277 and accompanying text.
176. For full discussion of MLBPA’s public policy argument, see infra notes
177-211 and accompanying text.  For full discussion of MLBPA’s unconscionability
argument, see infra notes 215-250 and accompanying text.  For full discussion of
MLBPA’s undue influence argument, see infra notes 254-261 and accompanying
text.
177. See, e.g., Huber v. Culp, 149 P. 216, 219 (Okla. 1915) (holding clause
preventing either party in divorce proceeding from defending divorce action was
against public policy).
178. See 17A C.J.S. CONTRACTS § 295 (2003) (“A[s] the habits, opinions, and
wants of a people vary with the times, so public policy may change with them.”).
179. See Ghodoosi, supra note 118, at 694 (attributing difficulties with defin-
ing public policy that invalidates contracts to multidimensional nature of public
policy within its own field).
180. Feleccia v. Lackawanna College, 215 A.3d 3, 19 (Pa. 2019) (discussing
difficulty of meeting burden in demonstrating public policy because party claiming
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would then weigh the MLB’s actions under that public policy to
conclude whether the players’ decision to play under the 2020
Agreement violates that public policy.181  To do so, the court would
look to the federal and state mandates, CDC guidance, and other
indicators of public opinion surrounding the coronavirus pan-
demic.182  In the case of the pandemic, there have been several pol-
icies put in place that indicate a public policy favoring precautions
to protect against the spread of coronavirus.183  The strongest poli-
cies surrounding coronavirus were the initial stay-at-home orders,
though current mandates under which the court would assess a vio-
lation of public policy are the orders imposing mask mandates, lim-
ited building capacities, and social distancing in states across the
United States.184
These government mandates are clear indicators of public pol-
icy for the states where they are in place, because the legislatures of
each of those states have granted their executive branch the author-
ity to act in a public health emergency and thus, have granted the
governors of each of those states the power to implement and en-
force coronavirus precautions.185  The mandates are also indicators
of the public morals surrounding wearing masks, because the
elected officials of the state have placed high value on the need for
citizens to protect each other against the spread of coronavirus.186
Additionally, general guidance from the CDC, as a part of the De-
contract is invalid as against public policy must show policy is dominantly held as
public policy).  For further discussion of the precautions taken at state and federal
levels, see supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
181. For further discussion of the tests the court would use to weigh the
MLB’s actions, see supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
182. For further discussion of determining public policy, see supra notes 128-
131 and accompanying text.
183. See Jennifer Tolbert et al., State Data and Policy Actions to Address
Coronavirus, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.kff.org/
coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/state-data-and-policy-actions-to-address-
coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/TTJ2-DPVK ] (providing metrics at federal and
state level regarding original stay-at-home orders, reopening processes, and states
that have backtracked their reopening).
184. For further discussion of state orders regarding coronavirus precautions,
see supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 68 (offering examples of authority state legislatures have
granted to state executives to create mandates).
186. See Anne Zimmerman, At the Intersection of Public and Private Morality, 6
VOICES IN BIOETHICS 1, 2-4 (Apr. 12, 2020), (discussing variance of private morality
as feature of democratic society and noting states without orders are those in
which public morals are against restricting freedom to combat coronavirus). But
see Colleen Walsh, Why Some Americans Refuse to Social Distance and Wear Masks,
HARV. GAZETTE (Aug. 28, 2020), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2020/
08/sandel-explores-ethics-of-what-we-owe-each-other-in-a-pandemic/ [https://
perma.cc/6FY2-R3RF ] (interviewing Harvard Professor of Government Michael
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partment of Health and Human Services, can be considered policy
at the federal level.187
However, there is still an issue of whether all of the policies
requiring preventative measures are dominant policy, due to the
differing opinions among the public at large about how to handle
the coronavirus.188  This raises the question of whether the policy is
settled such that a court can act as the voice of the community with
confidence, because while a court could ordinarily look to the gov-
ernors’ orders mandating masks, social distancing, and limited busi-
ness activity to determine that the orders were put in effect
pursuant to legislative policy and are therefore representative of the
state’s policy, nobody would describe the current political debate
about mask wearing as “settled.”189
The variation in mandates across jurisdictions as well as the va-
rying degrees of acceptance of mask mandates and other precau-
tions among the public as a moral requirement only adds further
uncertainty as to how a dispute would be resolved by a court, in an
area of law that is already somewhat unpredictable.190  Since courts
usually begin to determine a state’s public policy by looking to the
state’s constitution, state laws and judicial decisions, many jurisdic-
tions would consider the governors’ orders with mandated
coronavirus precautions to be a representation of states’ public pol-
icies.191  There are also, however, some states that have not en-
forced precautions such as mask mandates during the pandemic,
Sandel who explains that many Americans view mask mandates as violations of
individual freedom).
187. See Government Response to Covid-19, USAGOV (last updated Aug. 26,
2020), https://www.usa.gov/coronavirus (defining CDC’s health information re-
garding coronavirus in US response to pandemic).
188. See Bobby Allyn & Barbara Sprunt, Poll: As Coronavirus Spreads, Fewer Amer-
icans See Pandemic as a Real Threat, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 17, 2020), https://
www.npr.org/2020/03/17/816501871/poll-as-coronavirus-spreads-fewer-ameri-
cans-see-pandemic-as-a-real-threat [https://perma.cc/8Y2T-XTPJ ] (reporting
about fifty-six percent of Americans “consider the coronavirus a ‘real threat’” and
growing number of Americans think it is “blown out of proportion”).
189. Walsh, supra note 186 (noting Harvard Professor of Government
Sandel’s observation that wearing masks has become part of wider partisan debate
in United States, because coronavirus pandemic came at time of high partisanship
as result of growing inequality).
190. See Friedman, supra note 119, at 572 (asserting descriptive categories pro-
vided by scholars such as Corbin and Williston are helpful for categorizing types of
contracts against public policy but do little to predict outcome of disputes in which
courts must decide whether contract is against public policy).
191. See Baugh v. Novak, 340 S.W.3d 372, 385 (Tenn. 2011) (explaining when
state’s public policy cannot be found directly in state’s constitution or statutes,
courts look for indirect expressions of public policy through state’s constitution,
statutes, judicial decision, or preservation of morals).
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and for those states it is unlikely those courts would find
coronavirus precautions to be considered public policy.192  Overall,
this means that the MLPA’s success in establishing coronavirus pre-
cautions preventing gatherings, requiring quarantine after travel-
ling across state lines, wearing masks and mandating social
distancing as settled public policy vary depending on the state the
suit occurred in.193  However, it is unlikely a court would find the
2020 Agreement to be against public policy regardless of where
they litigate, for the reasons discussed below.194
2. Did the Performance of the Agreement Violate Public Policy?
After determining the state’s public policy regarding
coronavirus, a court would need to assess whether the 2020 Agree-
ment and subsequent actions violate that public policy.195  The pur-
pose of the 2020 Agreement was to create a workable framework for
the 2020 season, in light of the inability to safely follow the 2017-
2021 CBA due to the pandemic.196  Obviously, baseball is neither
illegal nor against public policy, but is rather such a valued national
sport that it is being played during the pandemic.197  That means
that a court would only invalidate the contract as against public pol-
icy if the agreement either could lead to “injury to public interest”
in states with less defined public policy tests or could be “out-
192. See Markowitz, supra note 66 (reporting Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Geor-
gia, Idaho, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah do not have mask require-
ments); see also Marples, supra note 67 (reporting Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Cal-
ifornia, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
ming do not have travel restrictions in place for visitors coming from other states
in United States).
193. For further discussion of why courts will not find the 2020 Agreement in
violation of public policy, see infra notes 195-211 and accompanying text.
194. For further discussion of why courts will not find the 2020 Agreement in
violation of public policy, see infra notes 195-211 and accompanying text.
195. See Huber v. Culp, 149 P. 216, 219 (Okla. 1915) (establishing court can
only look to state’s constitution, laws, and judicial decisions when determining
public policy).
196. For further discussion of the 2020 Agreement, see supra notes 75-91 and
accompanying text.
197. See Juliette Love, How Popular is Baseball, Really?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/10/22/sports/baseball/base-
ball-popularity-world-series.html [https://perma.cc/A2TH-Y9XK ] (analyzing
baseball’s continually high-ticket sales and home viewers compared to other
leagues, attributed in part to sheer number of games in baseball seasons, to
demonstrate that baseball is still America’s pastime even if it is not America’s favor-
ite sport).
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weighed by public policy” in states that use the balancing test for
contracts against public policy.198
The MLB has taken several precautions in order to practice
coronavirus prevention while playing their season, including exten-
sive health and safety protocols to protect players and coaches.199
Additionally, in a limited reflection of state mandated precautions,
the 2020 Agreement also grants Commissioner Manfred:
the right to suspend or cancel the 2020 championship sea-
son or postseason, or any games therein, in the event that
(i) restrictions on travel throughout the United States are
imposed; (ii) there is a material change in circumstances
such that the Commissioner determines, after consulta-
tion with recognized medical experts and the Players Asso-
ciation, that it poses an unreasonable health and safety
risk to players or staff to stage those games, even without
fans in attendance; or (iii) the amount of players who are
unavailable to perform services due to coronavirus is so
great that the competitive integrity of the season is
undermined.200
These precautions were meant to satisfy safety mandates, but
they failed to address one major problem surrounding resumption
of professional sports seasons – to safely resume play, athletes are
required to frequently complete coronavirus tests, which uses up
tests and lab availability at a time when demand is high and labs are
constantly pressed to produce results.201  However, since govern-
198. See Hamilton v. Cash, 91 P.2d 80, 81 (Okla. 1939) (stating contracts are
invalid against public policy if they have direct or indirect effect against state’s
policies); Pyle v Kerman, 36 P.2d 580, 853 (Or. 1934) (stating similar facts in other
cases are not helpful in determining whether contract is void against public policy
because test is “the evil tendency of the contract and not its actual injury to the
public in a particular instance”) (citations omitted).  For further discussion of the
tests states use when assessing whether public policy invalidates a contract, see
supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
199. For further discussion of details regarding the precautions required by
the MLB and the MLBPA, see supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
200. Mark Townsend, Report: MLB Season Could Continue Even if Covid Outbreak
Forces Teams to Drop Out, YAHOO! SPORTS, (June 27, 2020) https://
sports.yahoo.com/report-mlb-season-could-continue-even-if-covid-outbreak-forces-
teams-to-drop-out-175518718.html [https://perma.cc/ZT6X-YV3H ] (citing SNY
Television).
201. See Henry Bushnell, Sports Amid Coronavirus: Are League Testing Protocols
Impacting the U.S.’s Pandemic Fight?, YAHOO! SPORTS (July 15, 2020) https://
sports.yahoo.com/sports-amid-coronavirus-are-league-testing-protocols-impacting-
the-u-ss-pandemic-fight-145213814.html [https://perma.cc/8ZN2-25WV ] (com-
paring testing services available to professional sports leagues with lab backups for
general population).  Bushnell reports that professional sports leagues can receive
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ment mandates have not generally been requiring state testing, the
issue of how available tests are used is a separate question from
states’ public health policies surrounding coronavirus, though still
an important question morally.202  Additionally, the precautions the
MLB adopted are still not as strict as the precautions required in
states with mandates.203
Even with the MLB’s heavy use of coronavirus tests and lax pre-
cautions compared to state mandates, in the event of litigation,
courts would likely determine that these precautions satisfy state
mandates such that holding a baseball season does not violate pub-
lic policy.204  First, there is an inconsistency even within public pol-
icy itself because on the one hand states with mandates for
coronavirus precautions want their citizens to comply with the pre-
cautions (including professional sports players playing in their cit-
ies).205  On the other hand, states have a policy of supporting the
sports and entertainment industry, in particular longstanding
sports such as baseball, for their positive impact on public morale
test results in as little as twelve to twenty-four hours, whereas tests distributed at
testing centers across the country can take up to five days to deliver results. See id.
(noting a five-day wait for tests makes tests less useful).  Bushnell also notes that
tests are available to leagues as needed, whereas there are lines wrapping around
testing centers in the United States to try to secure a coronavirus test. See id. (not-
ing experts agree that to some extent, sports leagues are absorbing testing
capacity).
202. For further discussion of state mandates, including the few states requir-
ing coronavirus tests or allowing them in lieu of a mandatory quarantine, see supra
notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
203. See Tyler Kepner, M.L.B. Tightens Virus Protocols Again in Wake of Out-
breaks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/06/sports/
baseball/mlb-safety-protocols.html [https://perma.cc/LC3A-X5CH ] (noting that
MLB has expanded list of areas where players must wear masks but that they still
are not required to be worn while players are on field).  Players also travel to com-
pete with teams from other states and cities, something that has been discouraged
for the general public. See Travel during the Covid-19 Pandemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL: COVID-19 (last updated Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavi-
rus/2019-ncov/travelers/travel-during-covid19.html?CDC_AA_refVal=
https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fcoronavirus%2F2019-ncov%2Ftravelers%2F
travel-in-the-us.html [https://perma.cc/B6HS-GP8D] (stating staying home and
avoiding travel is best way to avoid spreading coronavirus).
204. See Mamlin v. Genoe, 17 A.2d 407, 409 (Pa. 1941) (“There must be a
positive, well-defined, universal public sentiment, deeply integrated in the customs
and beliefs of the people and in their conviction of what is just and right. . . .
[O]nly in the clearest cases may a court make an alleged public policy the basis of
judicial decision.”); see also Huber v. Culp, 149 P. 216, 219 (Okla. 1915) (noting
public policy should only be used to invalidate contracts when court is free from
doubt regarding policy of state and contract’s potential to violate that policy).
205. For further discussion of the precautions and examples of state man-
dates, see supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
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and states’ revenues.206  Second, and more importantly, the health
and safety protocols included in the 2020 Agreement indicate com-
pliance with public policy to some extent.207  Since there is at least
some level of compliance with the mandates, courts would likely
enforce the 2020 Agreement because courts are very unwilling to
invalidate contracts against public policy unless it is clearly required
to promote justice.208  It is therefore unlikely that a court would
invalidate the 2020 Agreement as against public policy.209  How-
ever, even without finding that the 2020 Agreement is invalid as
against public policy, the way the MLB handled the pandemic in-
jured its image in the eyes of its fans, which will likely hurt revenues
in the future.210  This makes it questionable whether the low-reve-
nue 2020 season was worth the ten weeks of unfriendly negotiations
and hard feelings between the parties when it will potentially have
negative spillover effects for the 2021 collective bargaining negotia-
tions and MLB’s future revenues.211
B. Was Commissioner Manfred’s Imposition of a Season
Unconscionable?
A second defense against performing a contract, one which
highlights the MLBPA’s distrust towards owners going into 2021
collective bargaining negotiations, is unconscionability, which al-
lows courts to refuse to enforce a contract because it is unfair.212
206. See John Siegfried & Andrew Zimbalist, The Economics of Sports Facilities
and Their Communities, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 95, 98 (2000) (highlighting “fran-
tic competition” of local and state governments to attract leagues using new stadi-
ums, reduced taxes, and exemption from labor laws).  This demonstrates the
policy of states across the country to value the industry for its financial success and
the added value it brings to the community and the surrounding area because
major league sports teams such as those in baseball are essentially a limited com-
modity. See id. at 98-99 (presenting MLB grows fast enough to prevent
competition).
207. For further discussion of the MLB’s coronavirus health and safety proto-
cols, see supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
208. See Zeitz v. Foley, 264 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Ky. 1954) (“If the legality of the
contract can be sustained in whole or in part under any reasonable interpretation
of its provisions, courts should not hesitate to decree enforcement.”).
209. See Mamlin, 17 A.2d at 410 (holding societal opinions regarding term at
issue would differ, and no statute was on point, so contract term was not invalid as
against public policy).
210. For further discussion of how fans view the MLB and its players following
the 2020 negotiations and season, see infra notes 279-282, 321 and accompanying
text.
211. For further discussion of how fans view the MLB and its players following
the 2020 negotiations and season, see infra notes 279-282, 321 and accompanying
text.
212. See, e.g., Nw. Acceptance Corp. v. Almont Gravel, Inc., 412 N.W.2d 719,
723 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (holding contracts were unconscionable where defend-
36
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol28/iss2/7
2021] FORCED PLAY 535
The 2020 Agreement was described as unconscionable by well-
known player’s agent Scott Boras.213  This begs the question of ex-
actly how unfair the 2020 Agreement was, such that MLBPA could
have successfully satisfied both the procedural and substantive ele-
ments of unconscionability, or whether the terms reflected “ordi-
nary” unfairness – either way, the MLBPA is sure to stand its ground
in 2021 based on how unfavorably they viewed the 2020
Agreement.214
1. Procedural Unconscionability
While the court’s approach to unconscionability varies by state,
generally the party alleging unconscionability must show procedu-
ral unconscionability to some extent.215  In the event that some
breach of contract were to occur such that the MLBPA could raise a
defense of unconscionability, the court would therefore look to the
negotiation process between the players and the owners to deter-
mine whether the contract is procedurally unconscionable.216
However, if issues surrounding the 2020 Agreement were to come
ants were not given alternative to accepting equipment lease agreements that fa-
vored plaintiff); Sanderson v. Sanderson, 170 So. 3d 430, 436 (Miss. 2014)
(quoting Sawyers v. Herrin-Gear Chevrolet Co., 26 So. 3d 1026, 1034-35 (Miss.
2010)) (finding no unconscionability where plaintiff overpaid for farmland at re-
quest of elderly man later found to be “feeble of mind”).
213. See Passan & McDaniel, supra note 4 (“Agent Scott Boras, a longtime ad-
vocate for drafts rights, lashed out, telling The Athletic: ‘It’s unconscionable the
owners in this climate would reduce the collectively bargained money given to
drafted players in the top rounds . . . reducing the payments to those players . . .
cut[ting] their bonuses in this climate and us[ing] a pandemic situation in our
country as a means to do that, I really find it unconscionable.’”).
214. See Moore v. Woman to Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, L.L.C., 3 A.3d
535, 540 (N.J. Super. 2010) (noting both procedural and substantive unconsciona-
bility are required to declare contracts unenforceable).
215. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D CONTRACTS § 272 (1960) (defining unconscionabil-
ity involves demonstrating both prongs of procedural unconscionability and sub-
stantive unconscionability).  Some states view the two forms of unconscionability
on a sliding scale in which the more clearly present one form of unconscionability
is, the less important a showing of the other form of unconscionability becomes.
See id. (noting courts also find unconscionability on substantive unconscionability
alone if outrageous enough).
216. See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 449 F. Supp. 3d 216, 248
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (recognizing additional factors relevant to analysis of procedural
unconscionability, including use of high-pressure tactics, size of transaction, and
commercial setting of negotiations).  In a negotiation as unique as the one be-
tween the MLB and the MLBPA, the setting of the negotiations would likely play a
vital role. See Rascher & Deschriver, supra note 6, at 204 (analyzing MLBPA’s bar-
gaining circumstances are different from non-sports industries because MLBPA’s
political and economic interest expanded as it became stronger in negotiations
and its unique skill, giving it more leverage than a traditional union in
negotiations).
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before a court or arbitrator, it is highly unlikely that evidence of
procedural unconscionability would be found.217  Most impor-
tantly, the bargaining power between the two parties, while not
equal, is not so unequal as to raise suspicion of an unfair advan-
tage.218  It is clear from cases such as Chen-Oster, in which an em-
ployee argued an arbitration clause was invalid in a dispute with the
employer, that “courts apply the presumption of contractual validity
. . . with even greater force where the parties are sophisticated.”219
In the case of the 2020 Agreement, both parties are highly sophisti-
cated, with legal counsel representing them and experience in ne-
gotiations similar to the ones that occurred this past March.220
Another fact that indicates equal bargaining power is the
length of negotiations – the ten weeks of back and forth between
the MLB and the MLBPA indicates bargaining power on both
sides.221  In fact, the MLBPA’s decision to cut off negotiations is
217. See Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 158 F. Supp. 3d 369, 380 (E.D. Pa. 2016)
(providing that courts must determine whether contract was procedurally uncon-
scionable by asking whether there was voluntary meeting of minds between par-
ties).  The court provides examples of evidence that would support lack of a
meeting of the minds, including disparities in age, intelligence, experience, busi-
ness knowledge, whether the weaker party understood the terms or had them ex-
plained, and education. See id. at 380-81 (defining impact of meeting of minds on
procedural unconscionability (citing Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714
N.W.2d 155, 165-66 (Wis. 2006)).
218. See Rascher & Deschriver, supra note 6, at 204 (“In other industries, the
bargaining power of such a narrow union might be relatively low because of the
suitability of similar craft workers in another industry. However, MLB players are
highly skilled and unique; therefore, they are very hard to replace without loss of
productivity.”); see also Mike Axisa, MLB Negotiations Winners and Losers: Why Owners
and Players Union Show Up on Both Lists, CBS SPORTS (June 23, 2020) https://
www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/mlb-negotiations-winners-and-losers-why-owners-
and-players-union-show-up-on-both-lists/ [https://perma.cc/URQ3-TKH5 ]
(“[P]layers stood up for themselves these last few weeks. They insisted on full pro-
rated pay, which they received, and they’re in a position to file a grievance that
could alter the sport’s landscape . . . .”).
219. See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 449 F. Supp. 3d 216, 231
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (noting employees who signed employment agreement with arbi-
tration clause were well-educated and highly compensated).
220. See Eric Prisbell, Power Struggle: Behind the MLB Labor Talks and the Clash of
Personalities that Could Shape the Sport for Years to Come, SPORTS BUS. J. (June 22,
2020), https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2020/06/22/
Leagues-and-Governing-Bodies/MLB.aspx [https://perma.cc/7Z55-PNSC ] (pro-
viding background that MLBPA hired Bruce Meyer, who is known by MLB as un-
willing to concede on important issues, as their chief negotiator in 2018 to prevent
“the league [from] bully[ing] the union anymore”).  The MLB is represented by
Commissioner Manfred and MLB Deputy Commissioner Dan Halem, and the
MLBPA is represented by Executive Director Tony Clark and Lead Negotiator
Bruce Meyer in CBA negotiations. See id. (reviewing parties’ representatives on
both sides of negotiations).
221. For further discussion of MLB owners’ and players’ motives for the num-
ber of games played, see supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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what caused the imposed schedule.222  Additionally, the MLBPA’s
and MLB’s relationship is co-dependent, which gives both parties
leverage when it comes to negotiations, further emphasizing that
disparities in bargaining power do not extend so far as to leave one
party with no real choice, especially given the historical proof that
players in both the MLB and other professional sports leagues in
the United States are willing to strike when terms are unfair
enough.223  These factors would hardly persuade an avid sports fan,
let alone an arbitrator, that the MLBPA’s bargaining position is so
disparate from that of the MLB as to remove the ability of the play-
ers to freely reject the 2020 Agreement.224
Additionally, the MLBPA would be unable to argue that the
term of the 2020 Agreement awarding Commissioner Manfred the
ability to force a season is a surprise.225  The parties agreed to the
term as a foundational framework for the 2020 season months
before it was implemented.226  Additionally, it was announced by
Commissioner Manfred and widely reported across sports news and
media outlets.227  Furthermore, MLBPA Executive Director Tony
Clark negotiated the terms of the 2020 Agreement himself.228  In
fact, the ability of Commissioner Manfred to force a season was
222. See Scott Lauber, Players’ Union Cuts off ‘Futile’ Negotiations with MLB, Asks
Commissioner to Impose Season, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 13, 2020), https://
www.inquirer.com/phillies/mlb-players-labor-negotiations-tony-clark-rob-manfred-
2020-season-20200613.html [https://perma.cc/TAG9-Q7PX ] (recognizing MLB’s
last proposal called for seventy-two game season with seventy percent of prorated
pay for players, which disregarded players’ position against negotiating another
pay reduction).
223. See Rascher & Deschriver, supra note 6, at 205 (“[B]oth sides have
benefitted financially, with MLB generating in excess of $7 billion in annual reve-
nue and the average MLB player making over $3.3 million a year.”).
224. See Axisa, supra note 218 (stipulating while fans are generally pro-owner,
players currently have more fan support than any other point in baseball history).
225. See A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1982) (defining surprise factor of unconscionability as term in dispute being
hidden in lengthy text or fine print and drafted by party wanting term enforced).
226. See Joel Sherman, MLB, Union Reach Deal on Service Time, Other Coronavirus
Issues, N.Y. POST (Mar. 27, 2020), https://nypost.com/2020/03/27/mlb-union-
reach-deal-on-service-time-other-coronavirus-issues/ [https://perma.cc/RP55-
A3E2 ] (reporting of MLBPA’s large majority vote for final approval of agreement
formed in March 2020).
227. See, e.g., Passan & McDaniel, supra note 4 (“Major League Baseball and
the MLB Players Association struck a deal Friday that outlined how the sport would
proceed in the coming months.”); Perry et al., supra note 8 (“MLB and the MLBPA
also finalize a deal that establishes a potential framework for the 2020 season.”);
Silverman, supra note 11 (“Two weeks after spring training shut down, the sides
forged a March 26 agreement that laid out terms . . . . ”).
228. See Sheinin, supra note 76 (noting MLBPA gave Commissioner Manfred
authority to mandate schedule, including number of games).
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granted in exchange for the guarantee that, if the forced season
were to occur, the players would receive 100% of their prorated
salaries.229  This not only demonstrates that the agreed upon term
allowing Commissioner Rob Manfred to impose a season was not a
hidden term of the contract, but also that it was granted in ex-
change for a term favorable to the MLBPA, further evincing the
bargaining power of both parties.230  Overall, the MLBPA had bar-
gaining power sufficient to negotiate the terms of the 2020 Agree-
ment, they were not so weak as to have no real chance to reject the
2020 Agreement, and the term allowing an imposed schedule was
not a surprise.231  All of these factors weigh heavily against a show-
ing of procedural unconscionability, as they do not indicate a lack
of choice or a hidden term.232
2. Substantive Unconscionability
Despite a lack of procedural unconscionability, some courts
(or arbitrators applying state law) will still find unconscionability
where the terms of the contract are substantively unconsciona-
ble.233  This is due to the purpose of the doctrine of unconsciona-
bility – as an equitable remedy, courts look to restore justice, and
are comfortable doing so when there is gross unfairness regardless
of whether an agreement is procedurally unconscionable, and are
uncomfortable doing so even when a contract is procedurally un-
conscionable where no substantive unfairness exists.234  In the case
of the 2020 Agreement framing this season for the MLB, there is
229. See id. (noting players have not moved from their position that they are
to receive full prorated salaries since earning it in 2020 Agreement).
230. See id. (referring to prorated player salaries as concession on part of
MLB, and one that allowed for rest of negotiations to continue).
231. See Axisa, supra note 218 (detailing wins and losses of owners and those
of players, and recognizing that while owners ultimately got what they wanted with
as few games as possible, both sides won some battles and lost others).
232. See Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 158 F. Supp. 3d 369, 381 (E.D. Pa. 2016)
(including conspicuousness of disputed term in contract language and oppressive-
ness of term as evidence of absence of choice).
233. See Nw. Acceptance Corp. v. Almont Gravel, Inc., 412 N.W.2d 719, 723
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (stating procedurally unconscionable contracts are en-
forced if they are substantively conscionable, and if contract provisions are substan-
tively unconscionable, courts may refuse to enforce them without requiring
procedural unconscionability).
234. See WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 135, at § 18:10 (explaining contract
full of “gobbledygook” is not enough to create unconscionability without some
substantive unfairness, but noting that line between substantive and procedural
unfairness can become blurred).
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also little possibility the MLBPA could demonstrate that the terms
of the agreement are unconscionable.235
First and foremost, as noted by sports analysists at the time of
the final announcement that Commissioner Manfred would impose
a schedule in accordance with the 2020 Agreement, the terms did
not create one winner and one loser.236  Unlike in Northwest Accept-
ance Corp., in which a financing agent in charge of drafting terms
did so in a way “unreasonably favorable” to the agent’s own inter-
ests, the MLB engaged in ten weeks of negotiations and failed to
gain all the terms they asked for.237  Instead, neither players nor
owners got what they continually asked for throughout the ten
week negotiations.238  The players could potentially argue that the
owners “won” because they got a shorter season as they wished, but
this on its own hardly creates the sort of one-sided result courts
generally look for when determining the presence of substantive
unconscionability.239  The owners, in their bid for a short season
and salary cuts for players, essentially forced a shortened season
and missed out on other terms owners sought, including an ex-
235. See Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 940 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding no
unconscionability where plaintiff was not allocated harsh risks and where plaintiff
was well represented by counsel).
236. See Hoynes, supra note 83 (“This is a potential deal lined with broken
glass and razor blades for both sides.”); see also Axisa, supra note 218 (stating it
makes sense that players refused to back off of prorated salaries, because it opened
doors for owners to reduce salaries further in normal seasons, for example when
attendance is down); Tom Verducci, Everyone Loses in MLB’s 60-Game ‘Season’,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 22, 2020), https://www.si.com/mlb/2020/06/23/rob-
manfred-baseball-owners-players-dispute [https://perma.cc/LM44-AHNJ ] (argu-
ing delay in baseball’s return beyond stay-at-home orders in effect due to
coronavirus pandemic, when compared to ability of other sports leagues such as
NBA and NFL to return without such conflict, heightens negative view of both
parties by public).  Every day that negotiations continued and a deal was not made
for the 2020 season resulted in thirteen games lost for good – as of June 22, 2020,
the total games lost due to the delayed negotiations, the one-month gap between
negotiations and the start of the season, one week to test players for coronavirus,
and three weeks for spring training equates to 1,495 lost games. See Verducci,
supra note 236 (stating 2020 season “feels like 1994” again).
237. See Nw. Acceptance Corp., 412 N.W.2d at 723 (recognizing terms requiring
defendant to finance $100,000 of repairs on rented tool before receiving assistance
from plaintiff (financing agent) as one-sided).
238. See Axisa, supra note 218 (referring to MLB owners as “losers” in deal for
terms they did not get in 2020 Agreement, and referring to MLBPA as “losers” in
deal because of potential positive terms they gave up to keep prorated salaries).
239. See Bagley v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 340 P.3d 27, 33 (Or. 2014) (finding no
unconscionability despite terms favoring one party because terms were not so un-
fair as to constitute take it or leave it basis).  While Bagley discusses unconscionabil-
ity in the context of contracts of adhesion, it assesses the idea that favorable terms
do not constitute oppressively one-sided results per se. See id. at 37 (noting court
also has not found them to be per se enforceable either).
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panded postseason for the 2021 season and universal designated
hitters for the 2021 season.240
While the players likely think they “lost” the negotiations due
to the shortened sixty-game season, they were able to hold the MLB
to the prorated salaries promised in the 2020 Agreement despite
owners’ attempts to impose further salary cuts.241  The MLBPA’s po-
sition is similar to the plaintiff in Navellier, who was well educated
and advised by council and freely waived a legal right – here, the
MLBPA opted into the agreement that allowed a forced season.242
In fact, the prorated salaries term is the one that players bargained
for in exchange for the Commissioner’s right to impose a season.243
These bargains hardly demonstrate a one-sided result such as the
court would look for in a finding of substantive unconscionabil-
ity.244  Additionally, separate from the contract terms, the stance of
the MLBPA throughout negotiations has been that the players want
to play as long a season as possible.245  While this is not reflective of
the vocal minority who thinks it is unfair to expect players to play
240. See Axisa, supra note 218 (arguing in addition to terms owners did not
get included in 2020 Agreement, owners had “the less baseball, the better” stance
which caused owners to lose support that they had previously enjoyed from fans);
see also Hoynes, supra note 83 (arguing players turned down great terms without
getting much in return, except full pro rata salary term that was already included
in 2020 Agreement).
241. See Silverman, supra note 11 (highlighting clause in MLB’s 2020 Agree-
ment makes term granting players full prorated salaries conditional on presence of
fans, and owners wanted to reopen negotiations on that term following determina-
tion that 2020 season would be played without fans).
242. See Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 940 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting when
sophisticated party waives legal right, party also waives its claim that contract, with-
out waived right, is unenforceable).
243. See Perry, supra note 74 (viewing both 2020 Agreement allowing Commis-
sioner Manfred to force season and subsequent negotiations as true bargained for
terms); see also Mike Axisa, Rob Manfred ‘Not Confident’ There Will Be a 2020 MLB
Season, Says It’s ‘Just a Disaster for Our Game’, CBS SPORTS (June 15, 2020), https://
www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/rob-manfred-not-confident-there-will-be-a-2020-
mlb-season-says-its-just-a-disaster-for-our-game/ [https://perma.cc/98JW-JKMY ]
(arguing that initial bargain for imposed season at full pro rata pay turned into
main sticking point because owners wanted to continue to cut salaries).
244. See Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc., 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 322, 350-51 (2016) (find-
ing arbitration provision unconscionable where plaintiff was required to arbitrate
all disputes, but allowed defendant to obtain injunction stopping plaintiff from
exercising exclusive use provisions); Walnut Producers of California v. Diamond
Foods, Inc., 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 449, 460 (2010) (finding no substantive unconscio-
nability where plaintiff waived class action and only effective remedy against defen-
dant was in form of class action).
245. See Hoynes, supra note 83 (“‘Players want to play,’ said Tony Clark, the
executive director of the MLBPA. ‘That’s what they do. And being able to get back
on the field and being able to play, even if that means their fans are watching at
home, is something they’ve all expressed a desire and interest to do and to do as
soon as possible.’”).
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when it poses an increased health risk, it demonstrates the stance of
the majority of players and of the MLBPA on the players’ behalf
that the MLBPA wanted game play to begin as soon as possible.246
Finally, in light of the fact that substantive factors and procedu-
ral factors can sometimes be blurred, some of the strongest evi-
dence against substantive unconscionability comes from the
procedural formation of the agreement through which the ability
to force a season arose.247  As mentioned above, the negotiation
giving Commissioner Manfred the power to impose a season was
the result of a bargain – players were comfortable giving Manfred
that power so long as they were guaranteed fully prorated salaries in
the event he exercised it.248  The players’ willingness to make this
bargain exemplifies their disposition to perform the agreement ac-
cording to its terms, and given their position as a sophisticated
party, a court or arbitrator would be hesitant to find the term unen-
forceable.249  Despite the likelihood that a court would not find the
2020 Agreement or its negotiations unconscionable, the MLB’s ac-
tions that even make unconscionability a potential argument
(namely the owners’ continued attempts to pay players as little as
possible both through pay cuts and by reducing the number of
games and therefore the pro rata salaries of players) will come back
to haunt owners come 2021 collective bargaining agreement nego-
tiations – something the owners should have thought of before
246. See Bob Nightengale, Baseball Union Chief Tony Clark: “We Would Play as
Long as we Possibly Could”, USA TODAY (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/sports/mlb/columnist/bob-nightengale/2020/03/27/coronavirus-tony-
clark-baseball-union-return-play-conditions/2931734001/ [https://perma.cc/
X7BT-KPNS ] (“‘We would play as long as we possibly could,’ Clark said. ‘Obvi-
ously, the weather becomes a challenge the later you get in the calendar year, but
we would do our best to play as many as possible regardless of when we start.’”).
247. For further discussion of the initial terms of the 2020 Agreement, see
supra notes 10-12, 55-74 and accompanying text.
248. See Hannah Keyser, Who Has the Leverage? As MLB, Players Negotiate Base-
ball’s Return, Experts Assess Pay Cut Question, YAHOO! SPORTS (May 12, 2020), https:/
/sports.yahoo.com/who-has-the-leverage-as-mlb-players-negotiate-baseballs-return-
experts-assess-pay-cut-question-153216387.html [https://perma.cc/E9NF-SDAF ]
(analyzing players earned right to deny any pay cuts in 2020 Agreement, just as
Commissioner Manfred earned right to impose season).
249. See Bob Nightengale, Players’ Union Done Negotiating, Tells MLB to Simply
Tell the Players When to Show Up for Work, USA TODAY (June 13, 2020), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2020/06/13/mlb-players-association-reject-
league-offer-expect-short-season/3185398001/ [https://perma.cc/82BV-6PET ]
(reporting players are done negotiating with owners and waiting for Manfred to
exercise his right to impose 2020 season under 2020 Agreement).
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pushing for salary cuts for players consistently during 2020
negotiations.250
C. Alternative Remedies: Undue Influence
There are additional equitable doctrines of contract law that
function similar to unconscionability in excusing a party’s perform-
ance under a contract that the MLBPA could potentially rely on to
excuse their performance.251  Among them are undue influence,
fraud, misrepresentation, void as against public policy, mistake,
frustration of purpose, impossibility, and violation of good faith and
fair dealing.252  While not all of these doctrines would apply to the
2020 Agreement, undue influence is potentially applicable and can
be analyzed to determine whether they could provide relief to the
MLBPA under the 2020 Agreement.253
Although it is a separate doctrine and defense, undue influ-
ence is related to procedural unconscionability.254  However, simi-
lar to the analysis of procedural unconscionability above, any
influence exercised by the dominant party (the MLB) over the
weaker party (the MLBPA) in the MLB 2020 season negotiations is
unlikely to meet the elements required to be considered undue in-
250. For further discussion of a potential lockout during the 2021 collective
bargaining agreement due to distrust and animosity between players and owners,
see infra notes 275-277 and accompanying text.
251. See Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (re-
ferring to development of unconscionability from doctrine of fraud as “legal ar-
mor” to protect buyers from harsh terms set by sellers); see also Friendly Ice Cream
Corp. v. Beckner, 597 S.E.2d 34, 38 (Va. 2004) (“A court of equity will not set aside
a contract because it is ‘rash, improvident or [a] hard bargain’ but equity will act if
the circumstances raise the inference that the contract was the result of imposi-
tion, deception or undue influence.”).
252. See DIERKER & MEHAN, supra note 93, § 12:8 (referring to each of these
doctrines as defenses to breach of contract claim rather than independent causes
of action).
253. See id. (defining each doctrine, including burdens of proof for party al-
leging defense).  Fraud requires an assertion that documents were forged. See id.
(noting fraud can be asserted as a counterclaim).  Misrepresentation requires an
assertion that the basis of the contract was fraudulent. See id. (explaining party
claiming fraudulent misrepresentation must show reliance on fraudulent fact
when entering into contract).  Illegality requires that the conduct provided for in
the contract is against the law. See id. (detailing some contracts are illegal by stat-
ute).  Impossibility requires an act of God, the law, or another party that makes
performance impossible (not just expensive). See id. (clarifying impossibility also
includes commercial frustration).  To date, the author of this Comment has found
no evidence which would implicate these doctrines.
254. See Eberle v. Eberle, 766 N.W.2d 447, 484 (N.D. 2009) (differentiating
between undue influence and unconscionability because agreements can be free
from undue influence and still be procedurally unconscionable, but noting they
are similar enough to consider together in opinion).
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fluence.255  To show that the owners exercised undue influence, the
MLBPA would need to demonstrate all four elements of undue in-
fluence.256  To start, players are unlikely to demonstrate the first
element of undue influence, susceptibility to influence by the MLB,
because of the players’ bargaining strength throughout negotia-
tions, which enabled them to protect their pro rata salaries.257  Ad-
ditionally, the presence of lawyers in the negotiations on behalf of
the MLBPA strongly negates any susceptibility to undue
influence.258
Furthermore, the MLBPA would have difficulty demonstrating
the fourth element of undue influence, that there was an effect of
undue influence in the contract, because the players wanted to play
very badly throughout negotiations.259  The fact that a majority of
players wanted a season indicates that the ability of Commissioner
Manfred to impose a season, while potentially unfair to players who
wanted to opt out from the season but who could not afford to, was
not the result of undue influence because there was no lack of will-
ingness to play prior to the imposition of a schedule.260  Overall,
while an undue influence argument would not succeed for the
MLBPA because they were willing to play prior to the imposed sea-
son and they were well represented by counsel throughout, the via-
bility of a claim of undue influence represents a lot of the distrust
between the MLBPA and the owners.261
255. For further full discussion of the MLBPA’s ability to freely reject the
2020 Agreement, see supra notes 220-224 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 159 (providing example of jurisdiction that does not use
four elements of undue influence to assess its presence in contract formation).
257. See Nightengale, supra note 249 (noting players rejected MLB’s request
for more concessions on salary in exchange for a longer regular season as players
wanted).
258. See Pickman v. Pickman, 505 A.2d 4, 7 (Conn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
party claiming undue influence was “accorded every opportunity to consult with
his counsel prior to signing the agreement” and therefore failed to meet burden of
proof to establish undue influence).
259. For further discussion on recognition that players wanted to play, see
supra notes 245-246 and accompanying text.
260. See Miller v. Westwood, 472 N.W.2d 903, 912 (Neb. 1991) (citation omit-
ted) (stating when determining whether a party exercised undue influence, court
is only determining whether weaker party’s act was voluntary, not whether it was
right).
261. See Prisbell, supra note 220 (identifying Bruce Meyer, MLBPA’s lead ne-
gotiator, as unwilling to give in on important issues during negotiations).
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V. THE HIGHLIGHTS: MLB’S LESSONS (HOPEFULLY) LEARNED
FROM THE 2020 SEASON
The doctrines laid out above create a roadmap of the MLBPA’s
most salient complaints about the MLB’s negotiation tactics during
the 2020 Agreement negotiations.262  While the MLBPA clearly has
not breached the 2020 Agreement to necessitate the implementa-
tion of those doctrines, those same arguments are likely to be costly
for the MLB for the reasons laid out below.263  Part A of this section
lays out the costs the MLB is likely to face come 2021.264  Part B
suggests tools the MLB can use to avoid messy negotiations such as
those that occurred this past season, should another unforeseeable
event make the 2017-2021 CBA unworkable.265
A. The Cost of Hostile Negotiations
The MLB’s costs can be understood from several perspectives,
the most easily visible being the loss of revenue come 2021 negotia-
tions that is likely to occur due to a predicted labor stoppage.266
From more of a technical perspective, it is not yet clear how the
shortened 2020 season will impact salary arbitration or players’ sala-
ries long term.267  Finally, and most important for internal MLBPA-
MLB relations, the forced season will cost the MLB lost leverage in
future negotiations with the MLBPA.268
1. Loss of Fans, Revenue, and Peace Between Owners and Players
The various doctrines the MLBPA could rely on to excuse per-
formance of the 2020 Agreement offer limited support for the 2020
Agreement’s unenforceability.269  While the MLB seemed to con-
tain coronavirus transmission by the end of the 2020 season, the
262. For full discussion of the legal doctrines that highlight the MLBPA’s
complaints heading into the 2021 collective bargaining agreement negotiation, see
supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
263. For description of the completion of the World Series and of the 2020
season, see supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text.
264. For further discussion of the MLB’s likely costs of forcing the 2020 sea-
son, see infra notes 269-301 and accompanying text.
265. For full discussion of how the MLB can avoid similarly ugly negotiations,
see infra notes 306-312 and accompanying text.
266. For further discussion of predicted labor stoppage and resulting revenue
loss, see infra notes 272-278 and accompanying text.
267. For full discussion of the 2020 season’s impact on salary arbitration, see
infra notes 284-295 and accompanying text.
268. For full discussion of how the MLB lost leverage against MLBPA by forc-
ing a season, see infra notes 296-301 and accompanying text.
269. For further discussion of the contract doctrines that highlight the
MLBPA’s grievances, see supra notes 169-261 and accompanying text.
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potential fallouts of the decision to play the 2020 season can be
seen in the consistent tension between the MLBPA and MLB own-
ers.270  Additionally, the decision of the MLB to complete a 2020
season could be seen as unwise as the decision was made at the cost
of future games and revenue due to a potential labor stoppage in
2021.271  Even more unwisely, those future games are ones that fans
will likely be able to attend again in the 2022 season following the
2021 collective bargaining agreement, equating to an additional
loss of revenue from games in 2022 in which fans will be able to
attend beyond the revenue lost during the pandemic.272
The interruption to the MLB’s 2020 season due to the
coronavirus pandemic also disrupted a long streak of peaceful ne-
gotiations between the MLB and the MLBPA.273  Since the notori-
ously ugly strike during the 1995-96 season, the MLB has had
peaceful negotiations with each new collective bargaining negotia-
tion.274  Tensions between the MLB owners and the players were
already on the rise, as many players were unhappy with the 2017-
2021 CBA currently in effect.275  During the 2020 negotiations, the
accusations of bad faith on both sides, owners’ refusal to provide
data backing up their claims that they could not afford to pay play-
ers during negotiations, and the refusal of either side to budge at
the end of negotiations all combine to highlight the same issues
270. See Associated Press, MLB players Extend Streak of No Covid Positives to 47
Days, FOX 40 (Oct. 16, 2020), https://fox40.com/sports/baseball/mlb-players-ex-
tend-streak-of-no-covid-positives-to-47-days/ [https://perma.cc/8EWU-UW93 ] (at-
tributing most of MLB’s streak of negative coronavirus tests to MLB’s postseason
bubble).
271. For further discussion of how the 2020 negotiations caused hostility that
will cost future fan attendance, and therefore future revenue, see infra notes 279-
282 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g., Matt Traub, The Latest on Sports and Covid-19: No Cancelling Wim-
bledon in 2021, Club says, SPORTS TRAVEL MAGAZINE (Oct. 20, 2020), https://
www.sportstravelmagazine.com/sports-canceled-covid-nba-nhl-nfl-ncaa-nascar-soc-
cer-league-season-tournament/ [https://perma.cc/N3H2-ZVUU ] (“There are 15
teams in the National Football League allowing fans . . . .”).  College football has
also allowed fans in stadiums, as have some tennis events. See id. (noting large
venue capacities allow for socially distanced seating). For further discussion on the
impact of playing without fans, see supra notes 54, 210 and accompanying text.  For
further discussion on potential future revenue loss, see infra notes 275-277 and
accompanying text.
273. For further discussion of peace between the MLB and the MLBPA fol-
lowing the 1995 strike, see supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
274. For further discussion of previous labor stoppages in MLB negotiations,
see supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
275. See Lacques, supra note 40 (noting Commissioner Manfred has led own-
ers to “winning streak” for past two collective bargaining agreements, with owners
earning gains in revenue and salary caps and players running out of terms to give
in on).
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that have been contested in collective bargaining negotiations for
years.276  This only serves to exacerbate players’ unhappiness with
the 2017-2021 CBA and foreshadows potential labor interruptions
due to difficult negotiations when the 2021 collective bargaining
negotiations begin.277  The players’ animosity towards the MLB can
be seen following the 2020 World Series, when Dodgers third base-
man Justin Turner stated that “[a]t this point, the only thing deval-
uing [the World Series Championship] trophy . . . is that it says
‘Commissioner’ on it.”278
MLB’s 2020 season not only resonated poorly with the players,
but the entire sport of baseball took a massive hit in the eyes of the
fans.279  While both the MLB and the MLBPA were aware of reve-
nue losses from stopping the baseball season, the 2020 negotiations
carried an additional cost as the public was attuned to the difficult
negotiations during a time when many Americans were stuck at
home, struggling to make ends meet financially, or caring for a sick
relative.280  The fact that owners and players spent ten weeks argu-
ing about money during the pandemic reflects poorly on them.281
This is only exacerbated when compared to other professional
sports leagues, whose negotiations did not carry the same volatil-
ity.282  Additionally, the MLB’s coronavirus tests came back positive
276. For further discussion of consistent issues across several collective bar-
gaining agreements and 2020 Agreement negotiations, see supra notes 40-42 and
accompanying text.
277. For further discussion of consistent issues across collective bargaining
negotiations, see supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
278. See Passan, supra note 105 (reporting Turner’s statement as response to
Commissioner Manfred’s description of World Series Trophy as “a piece of
metal”).
279. See Axisa, supra note 218 (stating fans are generally pro-owner, as was
true during 1994-1995 labor strikes, but that players now have more support than
ever from fans).
280. See Perry et al., supra note 8 (tracking negotiations from 2020 Agreement
to Commissioner Manfred’s imposition of season schedule on June 23); see also
Mervosh et al., supra note 64 (showing implementation of statewide and local quar-
antine orders taking effect between March 9 and March 30, with most taking effect
towards end of March into early April).  For further discussion of previous labor
stoppages in MLB negotiations, see supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
281. See Bob Nightengale, Time Running Out: MLB Commissioner Could Imple-
ment Shortened Season Even Without Players’ Approval, USA TODAY (June 9, 2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/columnist/bob-nightengale/2020/
06/09/mlb-rob-manfred-shortened-baseball-season-no-agreement-players/
5331170002/ [https://perma.cc/846W-SZB8 ] (“Fans, so disgusted by the negotia-
tions during the pandemic with more than 40 million Americans filing for unem-
ployment the last three months, could turn their back on the sport and stay away
for good. Even if ballparks are completely open in 2021, they may stay away out of
spite.”).
282. See Bradford Doolittle, MLB is Having a Tougher Time Returning than NBA,
NHL. What’s Baseball’s Problem?, ESPN (June 1, 2020), https://www.espn.com/mlb/
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in higher numbers than the NBA and the National Hockey League
(“NHL”), both of which initiated a strict “bubble” to minimize risk
of contracting the virus.283
2. The 2020 Season’s Impact on Salary Arbitration
Another cost of playing the 2020 season is the impact the short-
ened 2020 season will have on salary arbitration between a player
and his team and on free agency.284  Both salary arbitration and
free agency status are dictated by service time – a player who has
three or more years of service in the MLB, but less than six, be-
comes eligible for salary arbitration and can arbitrate his salary
each year.285  In order to be eligible for arbitration, a player must
be offered a contract, or “tendered,” by the player’s team.286  If the
player is offered a contract or tendered, such player is considered
“under the control” of the club until the player gains six years of
service time.287  Once a player accumulates six years of service time,
story/_/id/29248967/mlb-having-tougher-returning-nba-nhl-baseball-problem
[https://perma.cc/43S4-A4TP ] (comparing MLB’s difficulties in negotiating
2020 season during coronavirus pandemic to relatively smooth negotiations in
NBA and NFL, attributing difficulties to differences in calendar, economic struc-
ture, nature of league competition, nature of on-field competition, sources of reve-
nue, minor league differences, timing of collective bargaining agreements across
leagues, relationships between labor and management, and public perception of
leagues).  Doolittle attributed the MLB’s difficulties to the calendar, because base-
ball had to start at the beginning of a season, whereas the NBA and the NFL both
had enough games in the regular season completed that they could start back up
in the postseason. See id. (noting both NBA and NHL have salary caps, whereas
MLB does not, and since salary caps are tied to revenue, economic aspect of nego-
tiations – including revenue sharing – was easier for NBA and NHL to determine
than it was for MLB).
283. See Stephanie Apstein & Michael Rosenberg, SI Survey: Doctors Say They’d
Play in the NBA and NHL, but not NFL and MBA, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 24,
2020), https://www.si.com/nfl/2020/08/24/doctor-covid-survey-daily-cover
[https://perma.cc/8PVU-GBUY ] (interviewing doctors to determine what leagues
they would consider safe enough to play in, with overwhelming results showing
presence of bubble versus no bubble is difference between doctors’ theoretical
willingness or unwillingness to play).
284. See Bob Nightengale, These 17 Arbitration-Eligible Players Could Soon Join
Full and Frozen Free Agent Market, USA TODAY (Dec. 1, 2020), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/columnist/bob-nightengale/2020/12/01/
mlb-rumors-these-17-arbitration-eligible-players-could-free-agents/6474590002/
[https://perma.cc/EL6K-NPNA ] (comparing differences in amount spent since
start of free agency in 2020 to amount spent at same time in 2019).
285. See Salary Arbitration, MLB, https://www.mlb.com/glossary/transactions/
salary-arbitration [https://perma.cc/9F6W-28FA] (last visited Dec. 3, 2020) (ex-
plaining MLB’s salary arbitration system under 2017-2021 CBA).
286. See id. (“Once a player becomes eligible for salary arbitration, he is eligi-
ble each offseason (assuming he is tendered a contract) . . . .”).
287. See id. (noting players and clubs can settle on salary, or attend hearing
before arbitration panel to determine salary of player); see also Free Agency, MLB,
49
Young: Forced Play: Was the MLB Commisioner's Decision to Force a 2020 M
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021
548 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28: p. 499
the player is considered a free agent and can join any club that the
player agrees with on negotiated terms.288  However, if a player is
not offered a contract, or is “non-tendered,” the player becomes a
free agent ahead of the scheduled six year service time requirement
set out in the collective bargaining agreement, though that free
agent still must participate in salary arbitration with the new team if
a salary is not settled prior to the arbitration deadline.289
While the MLB addressed service time in the 2020 Agreement,
ensuring that players who are active throughout the 2020 season
will get a full year of service time regardless of the length of the
season, it did not address the fallout of determining salary arbitra-
tion numbers.290  Specifically, a player’s performance is evaluated
based on statistics in salary arbitration, and the MLB has not yet
decided how the 2020 sixty-game season’s statistics should be
viewed.291  This is a problem this year because teams and agents
often base salary figures on comparable players – a task that is
much more difficult to do when nobody knows how the statistics
from the sixty-game season should be treated.292  The deadline for
teams and players eligible for arbitration to submit salary figures
was January 15, 2021, which means that teams and players were “in
the dark” in a unique way as they determined what starting salary
figures should be for arbitration without an official policy for extra-
polating season statistics from a shortened season.293  This is likely
http://m.mlb.com/glossary/transactions/free-agency [https://perma.cc/KYU7-
W4AF] (last visited Dec. 3, 2020) (providing examples of free agency).
288. See Free Agency, MLB, http://m.mlb.com/glossary/transactions/free-
agency [https://perma.cc/RMN6-2NZB]  (last visited Dec. 3, 2020) (explaining
free agents may negotiate with any club).
289. See R.J. Anderson, MLB’s 10 Most Intriguing Non-Tendered Players, CBS
SPORTS (Dec. 3, 2020, 10:07 AM), https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/mlbs-10-
most-intriguing-non-tendered-players-archie-bradley-kyle-schwarber-more-enter-
free-agency/ [https://perma.cc/9PST-YMF8 ] (providing background on MLB
service time schedule before discussing 2020 free agents).
290. See Craig Calcaterra, Report: Players To Get a Full Year of Service Time for
Games Played in 2020, NBC SPORTS (Mar. 25, 2020), https://mlb.nbcsports.com/
2020/03/25/report-players-to-get-a-full-year-of-service-time-for-games-played-in-
2020/ [https://perma.cc/EKS7-6NJ7 ] (discussing negotiations between clubs and
players, highlighting agreed term for service time).
291. See Nightengale, supra note 284 (noting MLBPA wants 2020 statistics to
be multiplied by 2.7 to equal full 162-game season, but MLB does not think it
should be that simple).
292. See Tim Dierkes, Projected Arbitration Salaries for Fall 2021, MLB TRADE RU-
MORS (Oct. 15, 2020, 10:59 PM), https://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2020/10/pro-
jected-arbitration-salaries-for-2021.html [https://perma.cc/4RYB-NLJF ]
(discussing impact of 2020 statistics on salary arbitration).
293. See R.J. Anderson & Mike Axisa, MLB Offseason Key Dates 2020-21: Non-
Tender Deadline, Winter Meetings, Opening Day 2021, More, CBS SPORTS (Dec. 2,
2020), https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/mlbs-10-most-intriguing-non-ten-
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to impact the amount of money players and teams negotiate for, as
2020’s abbreviated statistics are not easily comparable to other
years.294  While the 2020 Agreement includes a term that 2020-21
arbitration salaries will not directly impact future salary classes in
arbitration, it is still unlikely that the potentially low 2021 salaries as
a result of the lost revenue will be ignored when considering play-
ers’ salaries in future seasons.295
3. MLB’s Lost Leverage
Another potential consequence of the MLB’s forced 2020 sea-
son is an increase in the willingness of the MLBPA to stand their
ground on collective bargaining terms.296  As noted earlier, the
MLBPA has acquiesced to owners’ terms in several of the last collec-
tive bargaining negotiations, to the point that the MLBPA is run-
ning out of terms to give in on.297  Such concessions, combined
with the unfair treatment players received during 2020 season nego-
tiations, will only further fuel players’ incentives to negotiate hard
during 2021 negotiations.298  That, combined with the drop in the
public opinion of owners, will leave the MLB in a difficult place
come 2021, when the owners will likely have to make large conces-
sions or face the first labor stoppage in twenty-five years.299  Finally,
regardless of whether the MLBPA’s potential legal arguments
would have won, the legal strength of those arguments give
credence to the players’ grievances that the MLBPA will rely on to
dered-players-archie-bradley-kyle-schwarber-more-enter-free-agency/ [https://
perma.cc/FA6B-5R2G ] (discussing off-season dates and deadlines for contracting
with players to form teams for 2021 season).
294. See Tim Dierkes, The Looming Arbitration Battle, MLB TRADE RUMORS (Oct.
13, 2020), https://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2020/10/the-looming-arbitration-
battle.html [https://perma.cc/RQ3Q-R89M ] (discussing how arbitration usually
results in players and clubs “meet[ing] in the middle” which will impact amount of
money clubs and players should be prepared to pay and receive).
295. See id. (noting past salaries are usually considered when players move
through arbitration system).
296. For further discussion of players’ increased willingness to stand up for
themselves, see supra notes 218-220 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 275 (discussing “winning streak” owners have had over
past two collective bargaining agreements).
298. See Lacques, supra note 40 (noting players are “increasingly prepared to
walk away in order to take back the power”).
299. See id. (reporting Phillies reliever Pat Neshek’s statement that “[o]wners
have a lot more to lose than us, I think. The players have been talking for the last
couple of years, putting money aside and I think we’re going to be ready for a
fight.”).
51
Young: Forced Play: Was the MLB Commisioner's Decision to Force a 2020 M
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021
550 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28: p. 499
ask for more favorable terms in 2021 negotiations.300  All of this
compounds in lost leverage for the MLB, making a stoppage during
2021 negotiations more likely unless the owners are willing to
concede.301
B. What to Include in the 2021 Collective Bargaining
Agreement
It is clear in hindsight that the MLB should plan accordingly so
a similar situation does not reoccur.302  In fairness to the MLB, lo-
gistical obstacles arose that other major sports leagues did not have
to face, including the predominance of the coronavirus pandemic
at the start of spring training as opposed to the other major sports
leagues who had already played most of their seasons, and the sheer
number of MLB games required to be played between teams which
made forming a bubble challenging.303  However, that said, the
MLB and the players have the opportunity to act accordingly when
negotiating the new 2021 collective bargaining agreement so the
same problems that stalled gameplay for weeks are not an obstacle
the next time – whether it be another pandemic, or a future labor
stoppage the next time owners and players disagree strongly
enough to bring baseball to a halt.304  Knowing what went wrong
this past season, the MLB and the MLBPA should take steps to doc-
ument a plan, albeit in broad strokes, that would satisfy the need
for a shortened or flexible season in the future.305
In doing so, the MLB and the MLBPA should create a new
section in the collective bargaining agreement, whether embedded
in the agreement or as an appendix, designing a more flexible ver-
sion of the traditional baseball season that would accommodate
300. For further discussion of how the legal arguments the MLBPA could
have made reflect players’ grievances, see supra notes 113-117 and accompanying
text.
301. See Lacques, supra note 40 (“[Players are] willing to go multiple years and
I don’t know if [owners] are willing to sacrifice.”).
302. For further discussion of what the MLB’s 2020 season cost the MLB, see
supra notes 269-295 and accompanying text.
303. For further discussion of the MLB’s obstacles differing from other
leagues, see supra notes 282-283 and accompanying text.
304. See generally 2017-2021 CBA, supra note 7 (including Article XV with sepa-
rate rules for roster, game play, and team formation for All-Star Game, and includ-
ing fifty-six attachments and three appendices for additional terms related to active
collective bargaining agreement terms).
305. For further discussion on the delay in game play beyond coronavirus
restrictions caused by extended negotiations, see supra notes 71-74 and accompa-
nying text.
52
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol28/iss2/7
2021] FORCED PLAY 551
schedules when a full season is not workable.306  Such a section
would need to address the areas that prevented the MLB and the
players from quickly negotiating a workable season.307  This means
that the most important term to include would be a formula for
players’ salaries and revenue-sharing, since those were the main
sticking points that caused this past year’s negotiations to drag on
for ten weeks.308
Additionally, by the time the parties are ready to negotiate the
new collective bargaining agreement, the MLB and the players will
have a fuller idea of the impact the shortened season has on off-
season activities such as salary arbitration.309  Based on this under-
standing, the MLB and the MLBPA should put in writing a formula
or system for understanding statistics from a shortened season,
whether that be just relying on the bare numbers or extrapolating
the shortened game statistics to reflect what they would have looked
like over a full season.310  The parties could even include a written
schedule for when travel is not possible, such as regional competi-
tion among teams as occurred in the 2020 season.311  Perhaps the
one open question they would be unable to include is the specific
number of games that would be played, as it would depend heavily
on the reason for a more flexible schedule, although it is likely to
be less of an issue in the future if players’ salaries are addressed in
other parts of the agreement rather than tied to the number of
games as they were in 2020.312
306. For further discussion of terms of the 2017-2021 CBA that were not work-
able for 2020, see supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
307. For further discussion of the negotiations between the MLB and the
MLBPA, see supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
308. For further discussion of compensation as central to the 2020 negotia-
tions, see supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
309. For further discussion of the issues caused by a shortened season in cal-
culating game statistics for salary arbitration, see supra notes 291-292 and accompa-
nying text.
310. For further discussion of different methods the MLB could use when
evaluating statistics for a shortened 2020 season, see supra note 291-292 and ac-
companying text.
311. See Matt Snyder, MLBPA on Board with League’s Plan for Regional Schedule in




F8F5] (detailing games only played regionally to limit travel in 2020 as much as
possible).
312. For further discussion of compensation as the main issue in 2020 negoti-
ations, see supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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VI. THE CLOSER: WHY THE 2020 SEASON WILL CONTINUE TO
IMPACT THE MLB
Legally, the various arguments the MLBPA could bring against
the MLB did not come to bear – the reason players are upset is not
because the season was forced, but because players are upset with
negotiation tactics of the owners.313  Even if the MLBPA had sued,
it is unlikely that a court would find the agreement against public
policy, because the terms of the 2020 Agreement do not include a
purpose that violates public policy and the effect of playing baseball
during 2020 is not so injurious to the public as to render the con-
tract unenforceable.314  Courts also would not find the contract un-
conscionable, because the parties both have sufficient bargaining
power to understand and accept or reject the agreed upon terms of
the 2020 Agreement, which is what gave the Commissioner the abil-
ity to force a season (not to mention that the dispute would likely
be settled in arbitration).315  Additionally, the alternative doctrines
that would invalidate the contract would also be largely
unsuccessful.316
However, the impact of the forced season was never likely to
play out in the court.317  Rather, it is expected to be visible through-
out negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement for the
Players Association, because the 2017-2021 CBA is set to expire in
2021.318  Initially, the idea of missing the 2020 baseball season
seemed like the worst-case scenario, both economically for owners
and players, and in terms of morale for the country.319  However,
313. For further discussion on an assessment of the success of each contract
doctrine, see supra notes 208-209, 249, 260-261 and accompanying text.
314. For further discussion of the 2020 Agreement as invalid against public
policy, see supra notes 177-209 and accompanying text.
315. For further discussion of the 2020 Agreement as unconscionable, see
supra notes 212-250 and accompanying text.
316. For further discussion of the 2020 Agreement analyzed under alternative
contract doctrines, see supra notes 251-261 and accompanying text.
317. See 2017-2021 CBA, supra note 7, at art. XI (providing MLB grievance
procedure through arbitration panel).
318. See Silverman, supra note 11 (predicting failure to reach successful 2020
negotiation “does not bode well” for renegotiation before MLB’s 2022 season); see
also Hoynes, supra note 83 (“What happened over the last three months was a
skirmish compared to what awaits both sides in a little more than a year.”); Mike
Oz, MLB Commissioner Will Impose 2020 Season After Failing to Strike Deal with Union,
YAHOO! SPORTS (June 22, 2020), https://sports.yahoo.com/mlb-commissioner-will-
impose-2020-season-after-failing-to-strike-deal-with-union-004357208.html [https:/
/perma.cc/A2PU-V43U ] (predicting work stoppage after 2017-2021 CBA expires
due to increased tensions from negotiations and potential grievance players may
file against owners for failure to negotiate in good faith).
319. See Nick Ashooh, What is the Worst Case Scenario for Major League Baseball?,
NBC SPORTS (May 27, 2020), https://www.nbcsports.com/washington/nationals/
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the mess that was made of the negotiations beyond the March 26
framework has caused such a disruption to the relationship be-
tween the parties that it is likely additional revenue will be lost in
the future anyway due to a labor stoppage.320  This, in combination
with the dropping public opinion of owners in the eyes of fans and
the seeming inability of the MLB to stop coronavirus from continu-
ing to crop up has painted the MLB in poor light.321  It casts doubt
on whether the worst case scenario really was no baseball in 2020,
because it promises continued discord, fan frustration, and loss of
revenue in the future.322
Rachel Young*
whats-worst-case-scenario-major-league-baseball [https://perma.cc/E79L-3LYL]
(writing MLB is running out of time to avoid worst-case scenario of missed season);
Bill Shanks, What if There is No Baseball?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 6, 2020), https:/
/www.si.com/mlb/braves/news/what-if-there-is-no-baseball-in-2020 [https://
perma.cc/77D9-A9MR] (writing during negotiations that there “is reason to worry
about the worst-case scenario” of no 2020 season).
320. For further discussion of concerns about a lockout come negotiations for
the 2021 collective bargaining agreement, see supra notes 31-34, 275-277 and ac-
companying text.
321. For further discussion of the impact lockouts have on revenue in the
MLB, see supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
322. See Nightengale, supra note 281 (noting it took four years after 1994-1995
lockout for attendance to recover to prelockout numbers).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2022, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; Thank you to my parents, whose support has been unconditional and ex-
traordinary, and to my family, friends, and mentors for their encouragement in all
my endeavors.
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